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Abstract 
The fundamental lesson that emerges from this survey of regulating state-owned and municipal water 
utilities in developing countries is that sector regulation has to be embedded in an adequate and 
consistent institutional framework in order to have a positive impact on performance. Sector 
regulation, by itself, is no guarantee of performance improvements in the drinking water supply and 
sanitation sector. Case studies and empirical analyses suggest that without significant changes in the 
supporting institutions, the standard tools of regulation will not be effective. This conclusion is 
disturbing, especially for developing countries, since it means that the establishment of a regulatory 
agency might raise hopes, but ultimately, the agency’s rules are unlikely to improve performance 
without additional, politically difficult initiatives. An industry observer said “to have effective 
regulation, you must have utilities that can, in fact, be regulated”. The problem boils down to getting a 
broader set of institutions to support regulatory and managerial actions that promote good sector 
performance. This means getting the governance structures right (rules of the game) and the 
substantive actions right (play of the game). Conflicts usually arise in the politically-sensitive water 
services sector, so the regulator also needs to develop tools for conflict resolution. Thus, the 
conclusion that the institutional environment matters also provides a rationale for establishing a 
comprehensive set of governance reforms. These reforms may go beyond the jurisdiction or 
immediate responsibility of the regulatory agency itself. Nevertheless, an autonomous regulator can 
(in many cases) facilitate reforms that lead to lower costs, improved service quality, and greater 
network coverage. On the other hand, when both operations and oversight are part of the same 
organization (whether a ministry or municipality), pressure for strong performance is unlikely since 
reforms represent a public admission that past procedures were inadequate (at best) or corrupt (at 
worst). This study identifies best practice in regulatory governance and corporate governance of state-
owned and municipal utilities. The regulatory system goes beyond the regulatory agency and the 
water utility to include stakeholders that are in a position to support, block, or blunt reforms that 
would improve performance. In particular, this study documents how domestic politics can limit the 
effectiveness of regulatory institutions. Greater transparency (for example, via benchmarking and 
accountability) and citizen participation (via public hearings, public consultation processes, 
workshops, and consumer advisory boards) represent two ways the regulator can gain leverage against 
those benefiting from current dysfunctional arrangements. Without broad institutional support, even a 
technically competent regulatory commission will find itself marginalized by political forces that are 
far stronger. If the local “regulator” is the municipal commission, lack of professional skills and 
political cronyism usually exacerbate the problem. Ultimately, a sound regulatory system requires 
coherence, creativity, real-time communication, collaboration, consultation, and credibility. 
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I. Introduction 
Numerous studies have addressed water utility performance in developed and developing nations. 
These studies recognize the importance of the institutional factors affecting those managing water 
utilities and those providing regulatory oversight: social structures (the political and cultural context), 
formal organizations (regulatory commissions and government ministries), and support systems 
(including political patronage and civil service). These external factors affect how conflicts are 
resolved regarding resource allocation, pricing, and access to water services. In addition, these issues 
influence the internal governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By publishing key performance 
indicators (KPIs), the regulatory body can contribute to greater transparency. In addition, the 
information stimulates participation by stakeholders, including minority groups and those receiving 
rural water services. Favours to special interest groups that could be revealed by business plans are 
more likely to be brought to public attention when governments open their books. Ultimately, in 
conjunction with incentives established by regulators, external factors determine managerial 
objectives and actions. These objectives include financial sustainability (via cost containment, 
improved collections, and reducing non-revenue water), better service quality, and network expansion 
providing access to the poor through affordable tariffs (or targeted subsidies when necessary); 
alternatively, managers might focus on delivering favours to special interest groups, including 
contractors, employees, or politically-connected constituencies. The key issue is how to design an 
institutional system that reduces the likelihood that the latter actions prevail since they lead to capture, 
corruption and low levels of utility performance. 
A. Standards for measuring performance 
Competitive markets have two key features: (1) informed consumers make choices from among a 
variety of products (of different qualities); and (2) those providing capital allocate funds to a large 
number of firms that are meeting those demands at least cost. In competitive markets, prices are 
signals to both producers and consumers: increases in demand lead to short term above-normal profits, 
causing firms to expand output. Initially, the higher prices lead to less consumption than would 
otherwise be the case, but entry further increases output and reduces price. Similarly, when production 
costs rise (causing prices to increase) quantity demanded falls. On the other hand, competition leads to 
lower prices when production costs fall (as a result of improved technologies or lower input prices). 
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Industry performance is evaluated in terms of consumer satisfaction, the absence of long term 
excessive profits, the adoption of cost-reducing innovations, new product introductions, workplace 
safety, service quality, and an absence of negative environmental impacts. 
When there are substantial scale economies, a single provider of the product is the least-cost 
way to organize production: a natural monopoly. However, an unregulated (privately-owned) natural 
monopoly has very different performance from what one finds in a competitive market: consumers 
face high prices and low quality, and the monopoly obtains excessive profits. Regulation can bring 
price in line with cost, and (with proper incentives) promote cost containment for a product or service, 
at a quality that is valued by consumers (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988).1 In the case of water and 
sanitation utilities, additional public interest concerns regarding health and access by the poor have 
resulted in state- and municipally-owned utilities in most nations. However, the objectives (and 
institutional context) for these utilities differ from those of privately-owned monopolists. 
Eisendrath (2012) underscores the differences between privately and publicly-owned utilities: 
“When a regulator regulates a privately owned utility, [the] main concern of the shareholders is their 
return on equity, their free cash flow and their dividends. Under rate of return regulation ..., the 
regulator has a benchmark ... [return on equity] that they will build into the revenue requirement and 
tariff order. Under incentive-based regulation, ... the regulator also sets a framework for allowed 
equity return. In either case, the shareholders are very interested in their equity returns”. Thus, 
Eisendrath emphasizes the role of capital markets as placing discipline on a regulated utility that is 
separate and independent from those pressures placed on the firm by a sector regulator. Investors 
monitor both managerial actions and the regulatory climate, where the latter is evaluated in terms of 
regulatory consistency and predictability. Those providing capital consider whether regulators are 
providing the utility an opportunity (but not a guarantee) to earn a reasonable (or fair) return on 
investment. To earn that return, managers are then incentivized to achieve cost containment, quality 
improvements that are valued by customers, and network expansions (when prices recover costs that 
are incurred). In principle, regulation attempts to replicate what would happen in a competitive market 
when managerial success is gauged by financial performance. 
Eisendrath (2012) also identifies the governance structure of private utilities as an important 
element of the system: “Similarly, in a private utility, the board, appointed by shareholders, will have 
the power to establish bonuses for management based on performance, salary levels, and to appoint 
and fire management. There are often substantial benefits to shareholders and management associated 
with performance, and similarly, when there is poor performance, boards and management are often 
replaced”. His key point is that in order for the board of directors to be in a position to discipline weak 
managers, owners of the utility require transparency regarding trends in performance indicators, 
particularly financial performance. 
However, government ownership introduces some complications into the governance process: 
“In state-owned utilities, there is often little concern about return on equity, dividends, or bonuses to 
management. Similarly, poor performance is not penalized. This is not a necessary condition; in fact, 
state-owned utilities can reward management with bonuses and ‘good’ salaries, and they can penalize 
poor management by not giving bonuses and replacement of non-performing mangers. Part of this has 
to do with linking incentives and penalties to performance”. Thus, Eisendrath (2012) identifies a 
theme that will be emphasized throughout the current study: the important role of incentives for sound 
managerial decision-making (where targets are based on careful performance benchmarking). This 
                                                        
1 In the United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887 as the first federal agency 
regulating the use of market power—in this case, that of railroads. California created its own Railroad Commission 
in 1879, but this agency was captured by the industry. Many states created commissions during the early 1900s; 
additional regulatory commissions for different infrastructure sectors were established in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Phillips, 1969). The Costa Rican regulatory agency was established in 1928, although most autonomous regulators 
in the region began in the 1990s. 
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commercial orientation requires professionalism within the utility and some insulation from political 
intervention. That does not mean that a SOE has no social objectives (such as ensuring access for low 
income citizens), but that the pursuit of those objectives should involve realistic business plans that 
are transparent and involve input from civil society. 
Eisendrath (2012) concludes that, in “state-owned utilities, these incentives and penalties 
associated with regulation often do not exist, or exist only in a weak form”. Thus, substantial attention 
must be given to “the corporate and sector governance mechanisms that create incentives and 
penalties. First, it is possible to establish appropriate corporate and sector governance arrangements; 
second, it is possible to use specific mechanisms to create incentives and penalties needed to make 
regulation more effective” (some of these mechanisms are described in Eisendrath (2013). Thus, 
governance arrangements and associated managerial incentives are central to achieving high 
performing state- and municipally-owned utilities. Of course, the first issue to be addressed is how 
governance arrangements are affected by the political power of different stakeholders. 
B. The politics of water 
Water services are politically salient: cost of service (even for a well-managed natural monopoly) 
can be high relative to some citizens’ ability to pay. SOEs may be particularly concerned with low 
prices; however, politicians can make promises without backing them up with adequate government 
funding. Thus, excessive political involvement in utility operations is almost certain to lead to 
inefficiencies: excessively low tariffs that starve the utility for cash needed for maintenance and 
network expansion. Furthermore, political objectives for the water and sanitation sector are seldom 
prioritized: low tariffs, network expansion, and service quality are reasonable objectives, but they are 
mutually inconsistent. In addition, citizens are not well informed about the financial sustainability of 
current prices (and promises): evidence regarding performance trends is often unavailable or not 
publicized. In such situations, external governance and internal incentives are often based on short 
term pressures from powerful political actors representing particular constituencies, sub-national 
governments, or multilateral financial agencies. Also, although there may be social sensitivity towards 
protecting vulnerable groups, the actual policies, rules, and outcomes often serve the interests of 
dominant stakeholders (depending on the political context). 
Thus, a standard recommendation made by industry observers involves developing 
mechanisms to insulate both the regulator and the utility from daily political pressures. The latter is 
important so the utility managers can base decisions on long term financial, economic, and 
engineering considerations. Of course, sometimes tariff issues are resolved outside the formal 
regulatory system, or the utility itself is more powerful than the regulator (particularly if a line 
ministry shields the utility from regulatory rulings). In the latter case, the utility managers can by-pass 
formal processes or just not comply with regulatory information requests. If politicians placed greater 
emphasis on water utility performance, the governance structures (including appointments to 
regulatory commissions, Boards of Directors, and leadership positions in SOEs) could yield dramatic 
improvements in performance. Indeed, there are numerous examples where this is the case.2 
Dozens of studies have focused on the performance of state-owned regulated water utilities. 
Based on an examination of case studies and empirical analyses, there is a consensus that without 
major changes in the supporting institutions, the standard tools of regulation will not be effective in 
significantly improving performance (Ehrhardt and Janson, 2010). 
                                                        
2 A census of water regulatory commissions in Latin America and the Caribbean, including information on founding 
date, staff size, and other characteristics, is available in Akhmouch (2012). 
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A World Bank report on infrastructure services in the Caribbean identified the following 
problems facing state-owned water utilities (Jha, 2005): 
 Overstaffing, with typically around eight employees per 1,000 connections. 
 High levels of unaccounted for water, typically more than 50 per cent, with commercial 
losses due to illegal connections, faulty meters, and under billing, making up about half 
the nonrevenue water. 
 Below cost-recovery revenues, which, in some cases, do not even cover operating and 
basic maintenance costs. 
 Lack of funds to make capital investments to expand the network and replace aged pipes. 
 Political interference in network expansion and personnel recruitment decisions. 
In addition, the lack of accountability and codes of conduct result in non-transparent 
institutional frameworks. 
The report concludes that “The combination of these issues leads utilities into a vicious cycle 
of value destruction. The inability to invest in network expansion constrains revenue growth; inability 
to invest in expansion or rehabilitation of treatment plants and networks leads to higher losses and 
more service interruptions; lower service quality decreases the willingness of consumers to pay for 
services and hampers revenue collection; lower revenue collection coupled with higher costs further 
limits the ability of these utilities to make capital investments” (Jha, 2005). 
In the past decade, those developing and implementing policy in the Caribbean have begun to 
take some steps to address these concerns. However, the listing of five problem areas appears in study 
after study of developing countries. Based on these problems, the author of the present report 
concludes that the fundamental problem is not engineering: it is the economic incentives and 
disincentives that accompany excessive political interference in commercial utility actions. 
In addition, the lack of a predictable and stable legal framework harms the regulatory system 
since neither sector regulators nor utility managers can make decisions for the long term when there is 
high turnover and legal uncertainty. Power asymmetries between interest groups lead to managerial 
behaviour that reflects political relationships rather than professional competence. Thus, the 
governance of institutions and the substantive decisions by authorities are central to water service 
sector performance. 
One could ask whether there is a need for a separate regulatory institution when the utility is 
state- or municipally-owned. Presumably, the water ministry (perhaps in conjunction with the finance 
ministry) is already providing oversight for national water utility operations. Similarly, if municipal 
taxpayers own the utility, the elected officials serving on the municipal council or commission should 
be monitoring and incentivizing utility managers to improve performance. However, the question 
answers itself: when both operations and oversight are part of the same organization, pressure for 
strong performance is unlikely since reforms represent a public admission that past procedures were 
inadequate (at best) or corrupt (at worst). In addition, governments can become characterized by 
policy inconsistencies, information asymmetries, politicization of operating and investment decisions, 
unclear priorities, and lack of stakeholder input. The establishment of autonomous infrastructure 
regulatory commissions was designed to reduce the role of politics in operational decisions and 
improve the external (and internal) governance of utilities. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has identified multi-
level governance gaps in water policy related to water resources management and to the delivery of 
water services (OECD, 2012): 
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 Policy gap: Overlapping, unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities. 
 Administrative gap: Mismatch between hydrological and administrative boundaries, 
with implications for long term sustainability of utilities if they are forced to turn to high 
cost water sources, such as desalinization. 
 Information gap: Asymmetries of information between central and sub-national 
governments, and between utilities and governments, and consumers. 
 Capacity gap: Lack of technical capacity, staff, time, knowledge and infrastructure. 
 Funding gap: Unstable or insufficient revenues of national, sub-national and local 
municipal governments to effectively implement water services policies, and to invest 
and operate infrastructure. 
 Objective gap: Competition, and lack of coordination, between different ministries. 
 Accountability gap: Lack of citizen concern and awareness about water service policy, 
plus low involvement of water users’ organizations, where lack of data and participation 
limits ability of affected groups to raise concerns in public forums. 
These gaps will be addressed here in the context of regulating SOEs. In addition, although 
water resources policies are seldom implemented by the regulator of water utilities, the two types of 
regulation have linkages that warrant attention. OECD (2012) concludes that “Sustainable financing, 
effective governance, and coherence between water and sectoral policies are the building blocks of 
successful reform”. Establishing these building blocks require addressing three issues: sustainable 
financing, effective governance, and coherence between national priorities, water supply and 
water resources management. 
 Sustainable financing: To increase access to drinking water supply and sanitation 
services, it is necessary to identify mechanisms that can be counted on to finance new 
investments (primarily higher tariffs, increased budgetary allocations, and issuing bonds). 
Higher prices are politically unpopular, but if the public has confidence in the regulatory 
system (and KPIs are improving) citizens will recognize the benefits that are being 
realized. Increased (and predictable) government transfers to the utility enable it to make 
investments that improve service delivery, although government funds have substantial 
opportunity costs. Finally, when a water utility issues debt, it has financial capital for 
investment purposes; in addition, managers are taking on an obligation to meet interest 
payments in subsequent years. 
 Effective governance: Incentives are essential for operational efficiency. However, 
context related information on past trends and best practice must be available to 
regulators, utility Boards of Directors, and managers. Then incentives can be based on 
benchmarking studies and well-specified targets for performance improvements. In 
addition, as managers do “more with less”, resources can be made available to promote 
fairness (in terms of increased coverage and enhanced access). Efficiencies enable 
managers to apply cash flows to meet social objectives that may not be financially self-
sustaining. Of course, customer advisory boards, workshops, and other mechanisms 
promoting citizen participation in the regulatory process provide other levers for placing 
pressure on managers. 
 Coherence between national priorities, water supply and water resources 
management: Without internal consistency, policies are likely to operate at cross-
purposes. While water resources management is not the central issue being addressed 
here, poor water management has implications for future costs, as water sources are 
contaminated, watersheds destroyed or aquifers drawn down. Competing water uses 
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include ecological habitats, irrigation, industry, power cooling, and utility services. Inter-
agency discussions about water resources, water quality, and utility access to water can 
help policy-makers make better decisions. At the same time, when objectives are neither 
quantified nor prioritized, managers (and political leaders) cannot be held accountable if 
water supply and sanitation sector performance appears to be weak—but those public 
perceptions cannot be documented. In such situations, developmental linkages are not 
established (reducing opportunities for entrepreneurs in supporting industries) and 
favourable health impacts are not achieved. 
C. Institutional context for regulation 
The focus of this report is on how the regulatory system can improve water and sanitation services 
provided by SOEs and by municipal utilities. Past research suggests that without a sound governance 
system, regulation cannot do much to improve the performance of SOEs—other than promote 
transparency and utilize benchmarking to put pressure on managers. The regulatory agency is one 
institution that is part of a regulatory system (as is emphasized by Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum, 
2006). The tools (and political influence) are generally inadequate for the regulator—unless the 
internal governance of the utility focuses on performance (via pressure from the Board of Directors). 
That means that the Board must be in a position to introduce incentives, evaluate managers, and 
remove those who are unwilling or unable to do their jobs. Thus, the external governance (power and 
interests of other institutions and stakeholders) must be part of an enabling environment. 
In political settings, public policy evolves in response to pressures on and from institutions. 
These institutions reside at three levels: broad social structures (reflecting norms and customs), 
formal organizations (such as regulatory agencies), and support systems (like civil service) (see 
Berg and Vargas, 2008). 
 Social structures: Informal institutions are the “norms and customs regulating socio-
economic life” (Casson, Giusta and Kambhampati, 2010). As such, they are mechanisms 
that facilitate cooperation or mitigate conflicts among sets of individuals: such structures 
become part of the social order, setting rules and procedures for solving problems. As 
part of the cultural context for governance, institutions can also be customs and accepted 
patterns of behaviour that encourage or discourage a wide range of actions. North (1990) 
and Ostrom (2010) are just two of the eminent scholars who have highlighted the role of 
social structures in affecting economic outcomes. 
 Formal organizations: Institutions can be organizations, such as courts or regulatory 
commissions. Such entities are established to fulfil specific functions: they emerge from 
complex sets of circumstances to address salient issues. Regulatory organizations 
generally have formal mandates, limited resources, and a culture that includes incentives, 
shared values, and a structure of decision-rights (Berg, 2000). Both sector regulators and 
state-owned water utilities are formal organizations embedded in a social structure. The 
fundamental problem is whether one governmental entity (a regulatory commission or a 
municipal council) can influence the actions of another governmental entity that delivers 
water services (which may be at the national or sub-national level). In particular, the 
utility might “bypass” the regulator, by drawing upon an alliance with the line ministry 
responsible for the water services sector. In addition, other formal organizations (like a 
water resources authority, environmental protection agency or a public health 
department) are likely to have jurisdictional responsibilities that overlap with those of the 
water utility regulator. 
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 Support systems: Institutions can also be part of the structure that supports formal 
organizations; for example, systems of political patronage or civil service systems both 
could provide the framework for capacity-building, information collection, analysis, 
advice, and policy implementation. Increased professionalism is generally viewed as an 
input for improving the effectiveness of formal organizations. For example, Ramió and 
Salvador (2008) examine how civil service reform affects agency performance in general. 
They evaluate these decision-support systems in eight Latin American countries, and find 
that civil service reforms tended to be externally imposed or involved emulating systems 
from developed countries, usually without domestic support; there seems to have been a 
lack of political consensus regarding the benefits of a more professional civil service, 
perhaps because that reduces opportunities for political patronage. 
All three types of institutions affect behaviour. For example, without a tradition of 
transparency in decision-making, corruption is more difficult to detect and punish. The social and 
cultural structures matter: behaviours that are viewed as unacceptable and are subject to penalties will 
be less prevalent than otherwise. For the utility itself, procurement processes might give significant 
discretion to managers, leading to opportunities for bribes and kickbacks, bid rigging, and fraud 
(Halpern and others, 2008). Similarly, meter readers may encourage (or be susceptible to) bribes. 
Finally, at the level of support systems, if citizens do not perceive the political system as providing 
channels for expressing grievances about the state of water services or do not understand the links 
between tariffs and utility financial sustainability, sector reforms will lack legitimacy. Voters are a key 
group of stakeholders affected by regulatory, managerial, and political decisions, so institutional 
support is degraded when citizens become disaffected. Of course, without mechanisms for citizen 
participation (in public hearings or other forums) they will not have a direct voice in utility matters. In 
some crisis situations, often related to privatization (as for example in Cochabamba and Tucuman), 
citizen protests arose when consultations were deemed inadequate. Note that there are community 
managed systems in which there is peer pressure for the payment of bills; in those situations, citizens 
understand the need for cost-recovery. 
There is no doubt about the importance of citizen perceptions regarding institutional 
performance in the large (as a foundation for social cohesion) and in the small (as scaffolding that 
facilitates governmental decision-making). Between broad systemic outcomes and underlying decision 
processes (civil service), are the agencies that implement public policy. Newly established 
(relatively) independent regulatory agencies are the focus of the current study. These agencies 
represent deliberate attempts at reducing the power of government ministries responsible for 
infrastructure (Checchi, Florio and Carrera, 2009). With some insulation from day-to-day political 
pressures, these new formal institutions were given authority to provide sector oversight, to promote 
transparency, and to establish incentives to improve sector performance. Ideally, regulatory agencies 
were supposed to have strong leadership (appointed through a well-specified process) and to recruit 
skilled professionals and avoid conflicts of interest. In principle, respected regulators and technical 
support staff could promote the long-run sustainability of important infrastructure sectors. In reality, 
the formal structures are not as robust as many had hoped, as the governance gaps identified by OECD 
(2012) characterize many nations. One reason for this gap between promise and performance is that 
the regulators were often initially created with the expectation that utilities would be privatized. It is 
much more straightforward to regulate a privately-owned utility than a SOE (Vagliasindi, 2008a). 
 Social structures affecting water sector performance. Citizens’ expectations are 
difficult to manage, especially when political leaders promise things that cannot be 
delivered. For some reforms, few benefits are perceived as “trickling down” to the poor 
or to those without access to services. In the high profile case of water supply and 
sanitation, initially, the costs of network expansion and service quality improvements 
were not widely recognized. In particular, when the price of water was initially far below 
cost, the introduction of a new regulatory commission could coincide with tariff 
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increases, but underlying problem was the non-sustainability of extremely low prices, 
unless significant taxpayer subsidies were available. 
 Formal organizations in the water sector. A number of organizations are involved in 
the development and implementation of policies in the water services sector. Here we 
focus on the regulatory commission, an agent of the state that often has some degree of 
autonomy. The functions of regulation include establishing incentives for good sector 
performance and communicating developments to all stakeholders. In the case of water 
utilities, many regulators lack the legal mandate to collect and analyze information in a 
timely manner (Jouravlev, 2003a).3 The shared values so essential for an agency’s 
success have also been labelled the organizational culture: “Culture is ... a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that the group [agency professionals] learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1992). 
 Support systems for improving performance. Civil service reforms can promote 
professionalism, but recruiting and retaining a strong staff depends primarily on salary 
schedules and opportunities for advancement. Thus, the pool of potential applicants and 
the processes for appointing commissioners and other top decision-makers both affect the 
culture of the formal organization.4 Technical skills are necessary but not sufficient for 
new agencies to be effective. Leadership, a factor often ignored in economic models, 
turns out to be a key determinant of organizational performance—both for regulatory 
commissions (McCraw, 1984) and for water utilities (Jamison and Castaneda, 2011; 
Alfaro, 2009). That means that any comprehensive sector reform needs to address 
governance and the selection processes for commissioners5 and for top utility managers. 
Furthermore, in the case of SOEs, while still being mindful of keeping an arms-length 
relationship, the regulator has to be willing to share ideas for wider sector reforms with 
the line ministry, even though the latter is responsible for setting public policy. 
Continuity in regulatory decisions is helped when there is stability in regulatory leadership. In 
addition, those responsible for appointments need to address gender issues and inclusive 
representation across different racial and social groups. 
At the same time, the resources necessary to comply with regulatory mandates are often 
controlled not by utilities themselves but by other agents that are not subject to regulation. For 
example, decisions on budgetary allocations for expansion or to compensate for low tariffs are usually 
the responsibility of the ministry of finance. So weak performance by the utility can be a reflection of 
“promised” funding that does not get transferred. In addition, in some cases utilities can (and do) 
ignore regulatory mandates. A large, national utility is likely to have greater political weight than that 
of the regulator, or it could be shielded by municipal autonomy (or instead of being corporatized, the 
service provider could be part of the general government apparatus). 
                                                        
3 Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum (2006) identify factors affecting the effectiveness of regulatory systems. Here, we 
focus on the special problems that arise when agencies regulate SOEs and municipal utilities. 
4 There is a need for empirical studies that draw upon developing country experiences regarding backgrounds of 
appointed regulatory commissioners, their tenure in office, and their activities after leaving regulatory agencies. 
Such studies would help analysts better understand the extent to which commissioners are insulated from political 
intervention and whether job opportunities after they leave the commission might be influencing decisions. 
5 The skill set for regulators should include some technical capabilities (law, finance, economics, management, etc.) 
but also the ability to communicate with different constituencies and to balance stakeholder pressures. Staff can 
provide the technical support needed for sound regulatory decisions, so long as excessive bureaucracy does not shut 
down internal communication channels. While studies of the staffing of water regulatory agencies do not exist, 
Pollitt and Stern (2009) examine human resource constraints facing electricity regulators. They find that staffing in 
Latin America does not appear to be constrained by funding or the availability of professionals. 
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D. Regulatory frameworks 
This section outlines a number of governance models that have been utilized for state-owned and 
municipal water utilities:6 
 Sector-specific national regulator. Some countries have established a water services 
regulator with oversight responsibilities for both privately-owned, and state-owned and 
municipal utilities. Depending on applicable laws for a particular nation, the sector 
specific regulator may be able to issue licenses related to regulatory functions, set 
performance standards, monitor utility performance (data collection), determine tariff 
levels and structures, establish uniform systems of accounts (where reporting 
requirements may differ for large vs. small utilities), arbitrate disputes among 
stakeholders, perform management audits (and require submission of business plans), 
develop staff capabilities, and report sector (and regulatory) activities to appropriate 
government authorities. 
 Multi-sector national regulator. Particularly for smaller nations, the multi-sector 
regulator has some advantages in terms of economies of scale, as well as consistency in 
the regulatory process and opportunities for learning based on experience with other 
industries. Such agencies generally have the same types of oversight responsibilities and 
regulatory instruments as sector-specific regulators. 
 Contract monitor. When infrastructure is owned by the municipality (and investment 
funds also provided by it), there can be a management contract for a private entity to 
operate the facilities. The monitor could be the municipal commission or a committee 
representing different government agencies. Even when utility operations are still 
performed by a SOE, when an external group monitors the performance contract, that 
group performs a role similar to that of a regulator—though usually with a much smaller 
professional support staff and with less discretion.7 Issues include the bidding process, 
managing and sharing risk, and instruments available to the contract monitor. 
 Municipal department. For example, the City of Los Angeles has a Board of Water and 
Power Commissioners appointed by the mayor, subject to removal without municipal 
council approval. The City Council determines rates, compensation schedules, property 
sales, debt issuance, and other aspects of utility operations and investments. The potential 
for political intervention is substantial: without clear separation from municipal politics, 
managers face procurement issues, multilayer reporting structures, hiring delays, and 
other problems (see da Cruz, Berg and Marques, 2013). 
 Utility reporting to municipal council. When the utility Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
reports directly to the Municipal Commission or Council, the elected members of that 
council offer the oversight that a sector regulator would provide. Of course, elected 
officials will be addressing a wide range of local issues and would (generally) lack 
expertise in water utility issues. Baer and others (2001) conclude that the oversight 
provided by the council seems to work for smaller cities. Prices are approved by the 
municipal council and service quality issues are addressed through public hearings. Of 
course, it is important to have procedures in place that constrain the municipal council 
from micro-managing the water utility, since that raises the likelihood of politically-
                                                        
6 Those models for the United Sates municipal utilities are taken from Baer and others (2001). Trémolet and Binder 
(2010) provide another helpful overview of regulatory models. 
7 Monitoring contracts involves the same types of data and incentive issues facing traditional sector regulators. The 
strengths and limitations of public-private partnerships are discussed in Marques and Berg (2010, 2011a, 2011b), 
Jouravlev (2000) and Vergès (2010). 
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motivated initiatives rather than having business decisions based on professional 
evaluations of options. 
 Strong board or commission: independent municipal agency. Relatively independent 
governing boards are utilized in some jurisdictions. In this regulatory structure, the mayor 
appoints the Board, with confirmation by the municipal council. The Board sets rates and 
appoints (and removes) the General Manager or CEO of the utility. The CEO is 
responsible for customer relations, personnel, debt, and utility activities in planning and 
operations. The Municipal Council determines the transfer to the municipality 
(corresponding to a dividend to the “owner” of the utility). 
 Municipally-owned corporation. Like the strong board model, the Board of Directors 
(appointed by the mayor, often with municipal council approval) would oversee the 
utility, operating a separate personnel system. The Board represents the municipality 
(sole shareholder) and has the power to approve rates (see SALGA, 2011). 
 Municipal utility district. For example, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District has an 
elected seven member governing board, with managerial authority delegated to the CEO. 
This governance framework resembles that of cooperatives, where customers are 
“members” and voters. The governing board then provides oversight of utility activities. 
 Performance contract. The national (or state) government can have a performance 
contract that is monitored by some institution or group of agencies. In the case of 
Uganda, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and the Ministry 
of Water, Lands and Environment have a performance contract with National Water and 
Sewerage Company (NWSC) (and its Board of Directors), with targets for unaccounted 
for water, billing efficiency, water connections, and collection efficiency. Subsequently, 
the targets have been revised and incentives established for meeting them (see annex 1). 
In each of the approaches presented above, the variance within a category can be great, so it is 
difficult to fully outline the range of regulatory authority for different types of regulation. Suffice it to 
note that there is oversight by some authority, the water ministry, a national regulator, or a municipal 
commission. The key issues are related to how these institutions make information available, 
implement incentives, and evaluate performance. It should also be noted that local regulation often 
lacks the expertise to overcome information asymmetries and the transparency required to promote 
citizen participation. In particular, without some form of national data collection, it is difficult to make 
performance comparisons. 
E. Indicators of weak performance 
KPIs represent an essential element for benchmarking utility performance (Ferro, Lentini and Romero, 
2011 and 2012) and for establishing realistic targets for the utility. 
 Staffing: Employees per 1,000 connections is one KPI that can be used to gauge 
efficiency (recommended 2 to 4 employees per 1,000 connections)—taking different 
operating conditions (and outsourcing) into account. Managers of SOEs and municipal 
utilities generally do not have a significant incentive to reduce the work force and cut 
labour costs, since there is seldom any reward to achieving those savings. In fact, some 
view organizations that deliver public services as a kind of “employer of the last resort.” 
In addition, politicians want to have some control over the jobs available in utilities: to 
reward the party faithful and to gain support of key labour leaders. Politicians often want 
to place those who would promote their political agendas into positions of authority 
within utilities. In addition, turnover among top managers is a significant problem in 
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many nations, leading to short-term decision-making by those running the utility and lack 
of professionalism and institutional memory within the organization. The utility needs to 
prioritize human capital formation and the development of procedures that promote 
efficiency, but that requires funds and insulation from political interference. The 
organization’s culture is driven by its leadership. 
 Non-revenue water and collections: Indicators for both these aspects of performance 
capture the extent the utility has maintained the water network, reduces illegal 
connections, and improves the per cent of bills that are paid. Politicians often do not want 
to tackle the politically-sensitive issue of water non-payment and theft (part of non-
revenue water). Some government agencies (such as defence or hospitals) may not pay 
their water bills, arguing that the money all comes from the same source and their budgets 
are limited. Cutting off residential customers for non-payment raises both public health 
issues and can be the source of political pressures. Similarly, reducing leaks requires 
funds for maintenance and leak identification—that implies either tariff increases or 
additional government funding, neither of which may appeal to politicians. Leak 
reduction is not politically visible in comparison with inaugurating a new plant or new 
connections (which are clearly seen as benefiting potential voters). Reducing commercial 
losses (theft) raises further issues requiring community involvement and changing a 
culture that views illegal hook-ups as acceptable—despite the fact that revenue burdens 
are passed on to others. 
 Below-cost recovery revenues: Total revenues that at least cover operating and 
maintenance expense is one indicator of financial sustainability (without even considering 
network expansion) (Ferro and Lentini, 2013). Tariffs are politically sensitive issues that 
are often beyond the control of the regulator. For example, in various countries regulators 
actually do not set prices (Joffe, Hoffman, and Brown, 2008); ministries have this 
responsibility. In countries where municipalities operate water utilities, municipal 
councils tend to set the tariffs. One strategy has been to have the price indexed in real 
terms (as in Uganda), avoiding big jumps in tariffs—which are likely to provoke citizen 
push-back. Certainly, citizen ability to pay is one determinant of price levels, but those 
actually receiving water are often relatively well-off. Cross-subsidies are difficult to 
eliminate in the long run, even if social conditions change. However, properly designed 
cross subsidies can be a reasonable option in many circumstances (Jouravlev, 2004; 
Vergès, 2010). When the regulator does have authority to set prices, they (generally) 
should move towards full cost recovery. In addition, targeted subsidies can be introduced 
to promote water service access for the poor. 
 Funds for capital investments: Trends in coverage give an indication of whether 
network expansion is occurring. Planning is difficult if government funding is 
unpredictable. If a SOE or municipal utility is credit-worthy, the issuance of privately 
held debt adds another external stakeholder who supports financial sustainability. Capital 
markets place pressure on the utility managers to maintain financial sustainability—so the 
regulator gains an ally when SOEs become subject to another external stakeholder with 
an interest in efficiency and cost-recovery. One task of the regulator is to lay the 
foundations for commercial funding sources, since that places direct pressure on 
managers to operate efficiently and makes service provision more resilient in the face of 
external shocks (Ferro and Lentini, 2012). The finance ministry would be another 
potential ally, if a hard budget constraint is feasible. Of course, such capital sources 
increase public sector debt, raising concerns about whether the national or sub-national 
government will raise funds for short term political gain. WSP (2009) and Advani (2012) 
have shown how local and international funding for utilities requires credit-worthiness. 
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There are many other deserving claimants for public funds, so water services sector 
performance needs to match “promised” outcomes. 
 Service quality: Standards include continuity (hours per day of service), system 
reliability, water safety (meeting safe drinking water standards in terms of 
microbiological and chemical quality), and mean time to repair breaks. There are 
important trade-offs between improving the service quality for current customers and 
expanding the network. This issue needs to be part of a public discussion, with input from 
political leaders and consumer organizations. Measures of citizen satisfaction reflect 
perceptions regarding the mix of service coverage (including access to public stand-
pipes), tariffs, and quality. Public information regarding service quality (by geographic 
area) is often woefully inadequate, limiting the ability of public input to put pressure on 
water utility managers. 
 Political involvement in network expansion and other decisions: There is no simple 
indicator that captures the extent to which the utility and the regulator are insulated from 
excessive political interference. The underlying premise of the current study is that 
interference from domestic politics is the key barrier to improved performance by SOEs 
and municipal utilities. Reinforcing this problem is the fragmentation of the industry 
(Jouravlev, 2004) in some nations—supposedly to increase responsiveness to local 
conditions; however, participants in local governance systems (municipal commissioners 
or part-time regulators) often lack expertise and tend to have very short time horizons. In 
other nations, a single national supplier has such political power that the regulator may be 
denied the tools necessary to regulate effectively. Professionalism and a focus on 
efficiency are less likely to characterize utilities embedded in politicized systems (Baietti, 
Kingdom and van Ginneken, 2006). 
F. Promoting transparency 
The underlying reasons for weak performance in SOEs and in municipal utilities relate to institutional 
factors. Clearly, the political and social structures within which utilities are embedded seem to hold 
water services as necessary for human dignity. Even with the recognition of the human right to water 
and sanitation (Justo, 2013), public funds and utility governance arrangements often do not support 
strong water utility performance. Funds for investment are not actually allocated to the utility and 
CEO appointments are based on political patronage rather than professional competence. Basically 
there is a dissonance between rhetoric and reality. Political leaders say that they want water systems 
that meet the needs of today’s and tomorrow’s citizens. However, one could argue that other 
investments have more immediate (political) returns, while the benefits of network expansion, 
maintenance, and better operations will be enjoyed by future leaders. Transparency is central to 
improving utility performance. 
Of course, the provision of drinking water supply and sewerage services is embedded in the 
fabric of civil society. They are bound to have a political and social dimension. Thus, it is proper that 
those in positions of political leadership set national and local priorities. The problem is that the entire 
process tends to be non-transparent. Thus, the availability of consistent and reliable data on KPIs 
would serve as a reality check for all those directly involved in setting and implementing policy and 
for those responsible for providing water utility services. So, if excessive political interference is a key 
barrier to improving performance, access to benchmarking information could serve as a catalyst that 
would reduce rhetoric and provide a foundation for establishing better external and internal 
governance. Of course, if the information is buried or distorted (and unavailable to civic society) the 
data collection effort will have minimal impact. 
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Up-to-date, consistent and audited information and citizen awareness of trends in water utility 
performance can alter the content and tone of public discourse. When utility business plans are 
brought under technical scrutiny, decision-makers are forced to confront reality. Realistic targets (and 
associated managerial incentives) are totally dependent on having timely, reliable, and consistent data 
on KPIs. When robust comparisons across utilities are available, politicians and managers are more 
likely to be held accountable for outcomes affecting the health and welfare of citizens, efficiency in 
the provision of water and sewerage services, and the long term sustainability of water as a valuable 
natural resource. Of course, again the utility’s Board of Directors becomes a key component of the 
governance system. If the Board is politically-driven rather than motivated to track and incentivize 
good performance, then the system lacks the good governance essential for monitoring management. 
The dissemination of information is necessary for external and internal governance to be 
effective. Thus, newspapers, radio, television, and the internet serve as platforms for communication 
among and between these organizations and groups. Regulatory hearings and less formal workshops 
provide opportunities for stakeholders to present their views. Suffice it to note that each of the three 
levels of institutions can reinforce or blunt efforts to improve water sector performance. The broad 
social structures matter because political institutions, the legal framework undergirding transactions, 
and the activities of agencies, educational systems (and associated managerial skills and attitudes), and 
work patterns all have an effect on the operational effectiveness of water utilities. Similarly, there are 
a number of formal organizations that influence sector performance in addition to the regulatory 
agency and the state-owned utility. These stakeholders include government ministries, non-
governmental organizations, multilateral financial institutions, local municipalities, and unions. In 
addition, capital markets can serve an important disciplinary role if it is politically acceptable for the 
state-owned or municipal water utility to issue private debt. Finally, civil service (professionalism) 
and citizen attitudes regarding political processes and the legitimacy of the regulatory system can 
support or hinder reform initiatives. 
Note that even if water utility performance is very weak, some group or groups benefit from 
the sub-optimal outcome. Savedoff and Spiller (1999) described the low level equilibrium as 
reflecting excessive governmental discretion in setting prices, leading to political opportunism: “First, 
substantive restraints on regulatory discretion must be embedded in the regulatory framework; second, 
formal or informal constraints must limit the ability of the polity to change the regulatory framework 
itself; and finally institutions must be in place that enforce those substantive or procedural 
constraints”. Of course, balancing substantive restraints on regulatory discretion against the 
advantages of regulatory flexibility depends very much on the institutional context. The three 
complementary mechanisms correspond to the three types of institutions: the broad political/legal 
framework, the interactions among formal organizations (including the legislature), and the agency’s 
own internal procedures (as implemented by leaders and professional staff). 
Taking a different approach to evaluating governance, Murillo, Scartascini and Tammasi 
(2008) examined the political economy of factors affecting productivity. The multi-dimensional 
matrix they use to evaluate the performance of economic institutions includes: 
 Political actors (key socioeconomic interests). 
 Mechanisms utilized by socioeconomic actors in their political demands (including 
campaign contributions and media campaigns). 
 Venues: arenas of the policymaking process (including political institutions). 
 Policy domains (policy areas, time frames, institutions, and historical context). 
Their focus is on developing an understanding of the political economy environment which 
affects both regulatory processes and sector performance. 
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The purely institutional perspective does not emphasize how different actors (specific leaders) 
affect the governance process. Yet we know that individuals and arenas of the policymaking process 
matter a great deal (see annex 1 and annex 2). Krause (2009) argues that an actor-centred institutional 
approach sheds light on how the recruitment, appointment, and retention of skilled leaders (and their 
insulation from daily political pressures) affect both managerial and regulatory processes. Figure 1 
depicts the context of regulation: broad social structures (cultural and political context), formal 




Source: Krause (2009). 
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II. Regulatory governance and substance 
A. Regulatory governance 
The consensus from previous studies is that governance is central to performance: policy-making, 
decision-making, implementing rules, and reviewing policy are essential if sector performance is to 
improve (Vagliasindi, 2008a). Regulation has been shown to be an effective mechanism for reducing 
price of private, for-profit monopolists (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988). However, as we have seen, the 
objectives and incentives of a state-owned (or municipal) enterprise are likely to be different from 
those of a privately-owned company: for SOEs, economic sustainability (often dependent upon 
budgetary transfers) is balanced against stated social objectives and (generally) unstated and non-
transparent political objectives (related to political patronage). Since monopoly by a SOE has a 
different agenda than monopoly by a private entity, the situation calls for different regulatory 
initiatives. Furthermore, these initiatives must be accompanied by complementary institutional steps. 
A study of electricity distribution firms in the Ukraine (Berg, Lin and Tsaplin, 2005) analyzed 
the responses of SOEs and privately-owned utilities to the same regulatory rules. The study found 
very different responses to the same incentives: privately-owned utilities appeared to inflate their costs 
of service (given the cost-plus nature of regulation adopted there) but they also significantly reduced 
technical and commercial losses (theft) relative to SOEs (again in response to incentives to do so). It 
appears that managers of SOEs were more concerned with the political implications of reducing theft 
(offending powerful groups) than were managers who were focusing on profits. Clearly, regulatory 
rules can have different impacts on utilities with different types of ownership. 
1. Evaluating regulatory governance 
We distinguish between regulatory governance (the laws and processes followed by an agency) and 
the regulatory substance (tools and rules available to regulators): “the how” of regulation and “the 
what” of regulation. In addition, we can think about utility governance, where best practice supports 
the corporatization8 of the utility, providing it with some degree of autonomy from political pressures. 
                                                        
8 Corporatization involves separating a SOE from a government ministry (or municipal government) so that its 
record-keeping is that of a stand-alone entity (PURC, 2013). The process should yield clear information regarding 
its balance sheet and income statements over time. 
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In terms of regulatory governance, Mustafa (2002) identifies some key questions for evaluating a 
regulatory agency: 
 How were the regulatory authority and its mandate established? (How detailed is the 
legislation? Are specific responsibilities assigned to the agency? Is there clarity in roles?) 
 What kind of governing body is the regulatory authority? (Is the commission sector-
specific, a collegial board, separated from political and business interests?) 
 How autonomous is the regulatory authority’s decision making? (What are the specific 
appeal procedures?) 
 Does the regulatory authority have enforcement power? (Is the authority clearly defined? 
Does the regulatory agency have access to information? Does it require utilities to utilize 
a standard system of accounts (regulatory accounting), so that the definitions of various 
accounting and operating categories are clear and consistent (Lentini, 2009a, 2009b and 
2010)? What is the authority’s ability to establish fines and sanctions or to award, 
enforce, and revoke a license?) 
 How much job security do commissioners and key staff have? (What is the appointment 
process, term of office, remuneration and rules for dismissal? Where do candidates come 
from and where do they return to? Does staff recruitment allow competitive hires?) 
 Does the regulatory authority have financial autonomy? (What are its funding sources? 
Does the agency have full control over expenditures and who audits the agency?) 
 Does the regulatory authority use transparent decision making processes? (Does it 
publish drafts for comment and publish decisions and justifications? What is the nature of 
its annual report? Where and how often does the agency hold public consultations? How 
is the regulator accountable to executive or legislative entities?) 
The above points could benefit from further elaboration. Two, in particular, warrant 
additional discussion: sanctions for SOEs and accountability. For example, it has been proposed that, 
in the case of a public corporation, sanctions must be personal rather than institutional in order to be 
effective (Solanes, 2007a and 2007b). Otherwise, the benefits of the wrongful act would accrue to the 
offender or the guilty party, and the cost would be borne by the State. As has been noted, “punishing” 
a SOE by lowering its prices can be perceived as benefiting current customers (which would be 
politically popular). However, in the long term, such a punishment hurts future and potential 
customers if the result is deferred maintenance and reduced network expansion. 
Accountability is another issue. Regulatory agencies should be responsible to the legislative 
authority and have administrative independence inasmuch as their decisions should be appealed only 
in courts of law (Solanes, 2007a and 2007b). This point is very important in that it ensures that, 
ultimately, the regulator is not the executive branch acting through administrative channels. The recent 
history of regulation in the region provides examples of executive interference with the regulatory 
body, often to the advantage of the regulated companies. When an agency’s legitimacy is based on an 
executive order, its authority can be easily undermined by a change in executive administrations. Such 
changes are generally more difficult to achieve via legislative processes. 
Of course, the above list reflects formal characteristics of the agency—which depend on both 
the law and the way the commission actually operates in practice. Furthermore, an agency that appears 
to utilize “best practice” in its procedures could still be associated with a sector that has weak 
performance. Thus, analysts evaluating regulatory performance need to focus on more than expertise 
and sound processes: it could be argued that trends in sector performance are the best gauges of 
regulatory effectiveness. Ultimately, sector performance is affected by the effectiveness of the water 
sector regulator. For example, an agency’s design determines the clarity of its role in relation to other 
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government institutions: specifically to the division of authority between the finance ministry (often 
responsible for allocating funds to a SOE), the water authority (usually the government agency 
responsible for developing broad policies including water resources management, specifically water 
allocation and water pollution control), other sector regulators, and agencies in other jurisdictions 
(sub-national level). 
It has been noted that various types of media filter information to the public. Newspapers, 
television, radio, and the internet all serve as gatekeepers who collate and interpret information about 
the regulatory process and outcomes. Thus, they shape public perceptions, including the views of the 
political elite. The media can also manipulate public pre-conceptions about the utility and the 
regulatory system—reflecting the channel’s ideological slant or the need to sensationalize rather than 
educate the citizenry. Thus, the media are often heavily influenced by political parties and interest 
groups. Nevertheless, regulatory decisions that are not documented or explained to stakeholders bring 
the process into question. Public participation and awareness are achieved via outreach activities and 
transparency in the process. 
The exchange of ideas within government and among stakeholders can help identify win-win 
options and develop consensus among key groups. A wide range of formal and informal mechanisms 
can be used to communicate with citizens. Similarly, reform champions can use interactions with the 
media as a platform for galvanizing stakeholders who would benefit from change. This raises the 
following questions: 
 To what extent has the government promoted transparency and accountability? 
 Have regulatory commissions attempted to communicate with stakeholder groups or are 
they basically tools of ministries, and thus unable to be a separate “voice” for reforms 
that promote efficiency and network expansion? 
 Have the press, television, and other media outlets helped educate the public regarding 
the facts of past and current infrastructure performance? 
 Is enhancing citizen awareness given priority by government, the regulator, utilities, or 
infrastructure suppliers? 
 Have non-governmental organizations, local research institutions, and other stakeholder 
groups played a constructive role in the reform process? Is there evidence that they had a 
particularly positive (or negative) role in public discussions? 
Answers to questions such as these would help outsiders better understand the reasons why 
regulators might be unable to get their “message” out to a wider audience. Water professionals (in 
groups such as the Inter-American Association of Sanitary and Environmental Engineering (AIDIS)) 
bring technical expertise and regional perspectives to water utility issues—contributing to public 
awareness in this area. Of course, if communication is indeed an important element of reform, then 
narrowly focusing on technical issues may be insufficient to generate broad public concern over water 
utility performance. 
2. Regulatory governance and transparency 
Principles of regulatory governance are far easier to list than to implement in practice. Each of the ten 
principles identified by Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum (2006) appear on other lists developed by 
experts and practitioners. It is difficult to argue that these are not important elements of a regulatory 
agency. However, they depend on the support of other institutions in the regulatory system to be fully 
implemented. The list includes (among others) accountability, autonomy, clarity of roles, coherence 
among objectives, public participation, predictability, professionalism (civil service), and 
transparency. Vergès (2013 and 2010) underscores the role of transparency for benchmarking and 
“competition by emulation” (Ferro, Lentini and Romero, 2011 and 2012). 
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It is useful to highlight one element of the broad political and social framework: corruption. A 
comprehensive study of 85 nations from 1990 to 2004 found that “public sector corruption such as 
bribery in the process of building and operating water and sanitation systems serves to significantly 
reduce a population’s access to clean water and adequate sanitation, at any given level of income. That 
is, even when a country has the financial resources necessary, whether domestically generated or not, 
to develop and operate proper water supply and sanitation systems, public sector corruption can and 
does keep the systems from being as effective as is possible” (Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, 2009). 
Berg, Jiang and Lin (2012) found that regulatory governance and regulatory substance 
combined to reduce bribery in the telecommunications sector. The effects were actually stronger in 
countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms. The study suggests that regulatory 
strategies that reduce information asymmetry (by collecting and publishing benchmarking data) and 
that increase accountability (through public rate hearings and other forums) tend to reduce illegal side-
payments for connections. Figure 2 identifies the links found in Berg, Jiang and Lin (2012): 
 strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance help 
reduce corruption; 
 competition and privatization reduce corruption; 
 the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with 
state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher 
telecommunication fees; and 
 bureaucratic quality exerts substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring 
capture and corruption. 
FIGURE 2 
FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEIVED BRIBERY 
 
Source: Berg, Jiang and Lin (2012). 
The results described above apply to the water services sector as well. Davis (2003) collected 
data on petty corruption in South Asia’s water supply and sanitation sector. In a sample of 411 
customers, 41% had made at least one payment to falsify meter readings for lower bills in the previous 
ECLAC – Project Documents Collection Best practices in regulating State-owned and municipal water utilities 
25 
six months. In addition, 30% had made one or more payments to expedite attention to repair work in 
the previous six months and 12% had made a payment to speed up new connection applications. A 
sample of 176 utility staff corroborated these numbers, with 73% reporting that falsified meter 
readings occurred “about half the time”, or were “very common” or “virtually every time”. The study 
also reports collusive bid-rigging by contractors, kick-backs from contractors (to politicians and/or 
managers), and other types of corruption. When members of the staff are under-paid and a culture of a 
non-accountability pervades the organization, employees take advantage of opportunities for extortion 
and side-payments. Davis (2003) concludes that transparency via new information technologies and 
the participation of non-governmental organizations can help reduce corruption: “Indeed, given the 
sizeable reforms that must occur in civil service in order to unravel the web of corrupt practices in 
public service provision, strategies that enhance these feedback mechanisms between customers, civic 
organizations, development agencies, and employees may be one of the few workable strategies for 
reducing corruption in the foreseeable future”. 
Figure 3 presents the elements of governance and substance for the regulator and the water 
utility. It identifies the elements of regulatory governance (laws and processes) and regulatory 
substance (tools and rules). These institutional conditions partly determine the governance and 
substance of SOEs. However, SOE governance is much more a matter of political decisions regarding 
membership on the Board of Directors, the extent of commercial orientation, internal performance 
incentives, and other elements of the utility’s internal lines of authority. The substance of utility 
decisions (relating to cost containment, service quality, financial sustainability, and other dimensions 
of performance) is affected both by external regulatory rulings and by internal incentives. Actual 
performance of the utility then determines the legitimacy of the system (in the eyes of citizens) and the 
credibility of the entire utility governance system (from the standpoint of external stakeholders). 
B. Regulatory substance 
The substance of municipal regulation of water utilities is not well documented in studies nor in cases, 
illustrating the lack of transparency in local regulation. Many of its instruments are similar to those 
available to better-funded, professionally-staffed national agencies. So here the focus will be on 
national (or state/provincial) regulatory authorities that can be single sector of multi-sector regulators. 
1. Regulatory instruments 
Water sector regulators have a limited number of instruments, but these can be applied to state-owned 
and municipal water utilities. 
 Issuing or monitoring licenses related to regulatory functions: In many jurisdictions, 
the water regulator has responsibility for issuing a “certificate of use” when a capital 
investment has been completed. Or it may be responsible for monitoring a license (or 
concession) issued by another body. Generally, existing production facilities are issued 
“certificates of use”, stating the standards under which the facility is to be operated. The 
regulator has a potential instrument since such licensing generally specifies operating 
standards that have impacts on costs and tariffs. However, what is the regulator of a SOE 
to do if those operating standards are not met? Withdrawing the certificate will affect 
service quality as production capacity is reduced. A penalty that takes cash from the 
utility is also a blunt instrument: managers can just reduce maintenance outlays. In the 
case of a concession, the regulator oversees the contract, ensuring that both parties 
(usually the state and a private entity or public-private partnership) adhere to the contract. 
 Setting performance standards: Performance standards on service quality and 
reliability have cost and tariff implications since these involve resources. Consumers are 
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willing to pay for a defined standard of service quality; however, performance standards 
have implications for the cost of service. Such standards can include meeting health 
standards, service continuity and water pressure, meeting installation or service repair 
schedules, and addressing customer complaints. Monitoring the outcomes associated with 
these standards involves benchmarking. The fundamental issue is whether and what 
incentives and disincentives are available to the regulator if the performance standard is 
not met. Criminal penalties and fines could be one mechanism for punishing 
noncompliance with regulatory rulings, though this requires that the law clearly specify 
the prohibited behaviour and identify penalty structures. In addition, this approach should 
be able to identify where, in the chain of command, the breach occurred (Solanes, 2007a 
and 2007b). 
FIGURE 3 
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 Monitoring the performance of regulated utilities: Collecting and analyzing data on 
costs, revenues and performance is essential for tariff determination by agencies. 
Although regulatory commissions need to avoid micro-management of SOE activities, it 
is essential that they be authorized to request information (according to predefined 
accounting guidelines), and receive appropriate responses. It is standard practice for 
regulated utilities to prepare audited financial reports on an annual basis to facilitate 
regulatory review. An independent accounting firm (or an independent state agency 
specializing in audits) could audit the utility’s books. The commission also needs the 
authority to penalize firms that do not comply with data requests. Similarly, regulators 
need the capability to benchmark operations and provide incentives for cost-reduction. 
 Establishing the price level and the structure of tariffs: The rate level is based on 
revenues required for financial sustainability. Rate structure refers to rate designs that 
allow the opportunity to recover prudently-incurred costs (including those associated with 
meeting environmental standards), incentivize the efficient use of scarce resources 
(including water), and promote fairness. This task is complicated when tariffs do not 
cover the cost of providing service. Thus, linking the revenues to an internally consistent 
business plan becomes an important task for both managers and regulators. If an 
equipment outlay was not prudent or does not meet the “used and useful” test, then the 
item could be disallowed from the rate base—reducing prices. As has been noted, 
however, reduced prices do not directly penalize a SOE. Regulators may be required by 
law to apply a particular methodology to set tariffs, or they may be given discretion in 
determining them (as in the United States where fairly general criteria of fairness and 
cost-recovery are often applied). In the case of SOEs, a case can be made that minimum 
tariffs be established to yield cash flows that are consistent with the business plan. A 
related issue is the control of transfers from other levels of government: are funds used 
for the designated purpose—maintenance, expansion or replacement—or are they 
channelled to other non-utility uses or to cover other costs? The regulatory commission is 
in a position to determine whether funds are actually used as intended by government 
authorities. However, the regulator has no power over whether, say, a ministry of finance 
actually follows through with past announcements. 
 Establishing a uniform accounting system (Jouravlev, 2003a; Lentini, 2009a, 2009b 
and 2010): Operators should be required to file reports in formats determined by the 
regulator. Income statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flows, and operating 
statistics are all essential inputs in managerial decision-making and regulatory review. 
These reports include financial and operating data needed to evaluate SOE performance. 
The cost accounting system should include a cost centres approach to facilitate the 
development of tariffs that reflect costs. Furthermore, accounting separation according to 
functions facilitates benchmarking—so performance comparisons can be made across 
utilities facing comparable production conditions (Ferro, Lentini and Romero, 2011 and 
2012). Annex 3 outlines the regulatory accounts utilized by the Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland (WICS); these apply to the state-owned water utility. Without a 
comprehensive system for collecting and analysing data, an Indian regulator has said, “I 
may as well be writing pretty poetry”. 
 Arbitrating disputes among stakeholders: Regulators ensure that facts are carefully 
documented and that different interests are well represented. Disputes may arise in a 
number of areas, including tariffs, expansion plans and access to water resources. 
Customer complaints about prices often are the source of disputes, but the issue can go 
far deeper into water quality and access to services. This particular role underscores the 
need for the regulatory commission to have the authority to rule on matters within its 
jurisdiction. Location of new facilities and cost allocation among different customer 
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classes both have differential effects on stakeholders. The regulator is in a position to 
organize workshops and promote dispute resolution. Delays in decisions are not neutral 
in their impacts on the various parties to disputes. There are two related issues: (1) in 
many cases, utilities have more political weight than the regulator; and (2) there can be 
conflicts between regulatory decisions (as part of the central/national government) and 
oversight at the municipal level. 
 Performing (usually via independent consultancy) management audits on regulated 
utilities: Typically, the regulator reviews the organizational elements of companies on a 
regular basis to ensure cost effectiveness and a continuous and efficient supply of 
services. This is not micro-management, but is a way for the regulator to document 
whether the utility is utilizing best practices. On a specified schedule, the regulator also 
reviews companies’ performance effectiveness (achieved through incentive plans and 
management contracts) to reach acceptable efficiency benchmarks. If annual reports are 
not available on a timely basis, the regulator will not be in a position to evaluate 
management processes. One possible component of a management audit that is probably 
under-utilized is the evaluation of managerial incentives. Clearly, regulators need to 
avoid micro-management. However, if the utility has no internal rewards to meeting key 
targets, that would be evidence that management is not doing its job. The laws of 
economics apply to SOEs and municipal utilities: if good performance is not 
incentivized, the result is weak performance. Bonus systems that are tied to improving 
KPIs represent one type of incentive that can improve performance. Uganda utilized 
internal incentives to achieve targets and strengthen the financial sustainability of the 
national water utility (see annex 1). 
 Developing human resources for the regulatory commission: Recruitment and staff 
training warrant particular attention as part of regular managerial responsibilities. In 
addition, compensation policy needs to be flexible enough to recruit able staff and retain 
the expertise that is developed. Also attention needs to be given to the nomination 
procedures and measures to avoid political appointments and undue rotation (to promote 
stability), control conflicts of interest, and encourage professionalization. Attention given 
to capacity-building is one indicator of the long term sustainability of commission. Of 
course, the funding of the regulator is a key determinant of resources available for 
recruitment, capacity-building, and staff retention. Depending on the law, regulators 
could obtain funds from a surcharge on utility bills; but even then, the central government 
may have the authority to allocate money from the trust fund. In such situations, the 
ministry (or legislature, depending on disbursal arrangements) is in a position to place 
pressure on the regulator. 
 Reporting sector and regulatory activities to appropriate government authorities: A 
regulatory agency should submit reports regarding sector activities to a higher authority. 
Given the expertise assembled at a commission, the agency is in a position to provide 
information and advice to appropriate government departments that are part of the water 
sector, including water resources management authorities and environmental agencies. 
Publicly available reports provide clarity in regulatory priorities, transparency for sector 
stakeholders, and accountability to political structures. Coordination between the many 
“regulators” that oversee the service provider is facilitated by commission 
communications. In addition, effective commissions are not passive: regulators do not 
wait for a crisis before taking actions. By being pro-active in the presence of (potentially) 
short-sighted government policies, the commission can bring analyses and forecasts into 
the public debate. The expertise based at the commission can inform the development of 
public policy so targets are realistic and objectives are compatible with one another. 
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2. Regulatory processes revisited 
The instruments can only be utilized as part of a regulatory process. So the substance of regulation is 
depended upon the procedures used to gather information, develop rules and regulations, implement 
decisions, and evaluate their impacts. The law or executive order establishing the regulatory 
commission may be specific about some of these procedures (just as it will be specific regarding 
instruments available to the agency), but there is generally scope for the agency to develop internal 
organizational structures and processes to apply the available instruments. This point is particularly 
important in the context of regulation via elected municipal commissions. 
One important issue (that emerges from the listing of instruments) is that of sanctions (and 
incentives). Economic or financial sanctions and incentives are often perceived as ineffective for state-
owned and municipal utilities and this is one of the reasons for inefficiency. At issue are the sanctions 
(and incentives) that could be useful and effective in the context of state-owned and municipal utilities 
(Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). Some internal incentives are described below. Since salary 
bonuses are probably the most powerful internal incentives for managers and utility staff, the utility’s 
Board of Directors should be in a position to reward managerial and staff teams that meet targets. 
These targets (related to coverage, cost of service, quality, and other dimensions of performance) 
should not be too easy to reach (since the reward should be commensurate with the effort required). 
Also, the targets should be consistent with citizen preferences, as reflected in public policy. 
The question is whether elected municipal officials who serve as both the Board of Directors 
and the regulator have the instruments and are in a position to implement processes to promote high 
performance levels in their local water utility. The municipal commission will have to depend to a 
significant degree on self-reporting by the utility management. Particularly for small and mid-size 
cities, the commission is likely to lack the expertise required to evaluate utility reports. In particular, 
unless there is a national benchmarking system, the municipal commission will not have yardsticks 
that enable it to evaluate trends and the performance of the local utility relative to comparable utilities. 
Without uniform accounting systems and full transparency, comparisons are difficult to make. 
Many SOEs do not utilize internal incentive systems, yet there is evidence that such 
incentives can have a significant impact on performance. For example, NWSC in Uganda instituted 
bonuses of up to 50% of salary if well-specified targets were met (Mugisha and Berg, 2008; Mugisha, 
2011). Targets included reductions in non-revenue water, improvements in collections, improvements 
in the working ratio (monthly operating expenses divided by billings), and better connection 
efficiency (active connections divided by total connections). The result has been high performance 
(see annex 1). As has been noted, institutional sanctions are more difficult to apply because utility 
managers are in a position to just defer investments or reduce maintenance outlays. 
The local municipal government generally controls zoning, density of development, and 
rights-of-way—all of which affect water utility costs. To this extent, having local regulation under the 
city government might improve coordination and planning activities of the utility. Managers are in a 
position to interact directly with counterparts in other municipal divisions. Disagreements are then 
resolved via the political process. One downside of having elected officials regulate the utility is that 
the pressure to keep tariffs unsustainably low will be great.9 The short election cycle means that 
municipal authorities are not insulated from short term pressures: officials are less likely to support 
decisions that are beneficial over the longer run (but have costs that are borne today). Another 
limitation stemming from the combination of operations and governance in the same entity is that 
managerial mistakes (and ethical lapses) are less likely to be publicized. Such information becomes a 
                                                        
9 In some cases, the SOE is the entity keeping tariffs unsustainably low. The government (as owner) may decide not 
to file for a rate increase, even though the regulatory commission would in all likelihood approve rates that move 
tariffs towards cost recovery (Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt, 2006). 
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political liability for those in power, so management is effectively insulated from the threat of 
regulatory exposure. 
These points underscore the extent to which governance, policy, and regulatory mechanisms 
should be separated for SOE. Under a unitary system, coordination is facilitated as governments direct 
the utilities they own to achieve stated objectives. The governance mechanism is the traditional 
hierarchical chain of command in ministries or municipalities. The Board of Directors (or municipal 
commission) sets policy, with tariffs and quality of service standards determined by those with 
ultimate decision-authority (generally the ministry or municipal commission). Regulation, ownership, 
and policy are all handled within the same organization—with the relationship between government 
officials and utility managers determined through the formal arrangements specified in law (or 
executive orders) and informal relationships among the various participants. Checks and balances that 
characterize other inter-governmental arrangements may not be very effective in the context of utility 
operations (in the absence of full transparency). When those interactions are heavily based on political 
relationships, Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt (2006) identify four problems: 
 selective representation of customer needs (with the poor, rural areas or marginal groups 
given less attention); 
 short-term political aims (resulting in below-cost tariffs and financially unsustainable 
water utilities); 
 capture of the water utility for personal ends (facilitated by the non-transparency of 
operating decisions); and 
 provider capture (where utility managers do not act in the interest of customers, but of 
other stakeholders). 
While a national regulator is not panacea, it does serve as a separate organization with 
expertise and a voice promoting efficiency. With appropriate legal authority and funding, its 
autonomy places the agency in a position to make decisions that balance current customer interests 
with those of future customers (recognizing the long term financial sustainability of the state-owned or 
municipal utility). In addition, with information collection and greater transparency, the regulator is in 
a position to monitor and publicize the performance of the utility. Finally, it can be insulated from 
undue pressure from powerful stakeholders. It can require managers to respond to citizen complaints, 
holding them accountable for cost containment and service quality. Note, however, the lack of 
sanctions reduces the ability of the regulator to put pressure on management: that requires political 
support for managerial and operating changes that improve KPIs. Thus, in the next section, we turn to 
improving utility governance as a complementary activity for sector reform. 
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III. SOE utility governance and substance 
A. SOE utility governance 
Several studies have documented the characteristics of well-performing utilities. Baietti, Kingdom and 
van Ginneken (2006) identify eight lessons for instilling good performance among public water 
service providers: (1) policy makers to correctly balance financial and political objectives; (2) success 
is often unattainable without reforming the external environment, with emphasis on the role of the 
owner; (3) fundamental regulatory and utility reforms are not a quick fix and cannot be substituted by 
privatization; (4) there must be an adherence to financial sustainability objectives; (5) other external 
stakeholders may be important to balance potentially conflicting objectives of politicians; (6) certain 
decisions must be left to managers; (7) separating functions and arm’s length transactions are 
important elements of the institutional setup; and (8) customers can be an important voice for 
improving performance 
1. Aligning incentives 
The eight lessons outlined above are derived from a series of case studies, and thus are based on a 
careful analysis of many high performing SOEs (Yepes, 1990 and Cadmus Group, KPMG and 
NuWater, 2002). The fundamental point is that specific actions are needed to align “owner” incentives 
with those of customers. These actions include creating a central policy and oversight body for water 
services. There are many structures for such oversight bodies. For example, the Dutch rely on industry 
self-regulation instead of independent regulators. The Vereniging van drinkwaterbedrijven (VEWIN) 
is an association of water companies, providing a mechanism for monitoring sector outcomes. In an 
effort to postpone the establishment of a formal regulator, it has taken on responsibility for improving 
sector performance (including service quality and financial sustainability). It uses benchmarking as its 
main tool for promoting good performance (Marques, 2010).10 In addition, these municipal utilities 
                                                        
10 Marques (2010) provides an overview of the tasks undertaken by agencies in charge of regulatory oversight. 
Regulating service quality, promoting transparency, benchmarking performance and other activities are described 
in terms of best practice. After considering rate of return regulation and regulation based on performance 
incentives, Marques provides case studies of eighteen agencies from developed and developing countries. These 
reviews of each country include the historical background, legal and institutional framework, market structure, 
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have independent Boards of Directors which represents another way to place pressure on 
management. Half of the Directors of Governing Boards are independent outsiders, like academics 
and civic leaders. The boards can hire and fire managing directors, provide a formal mechanism for 
reviewing their accomplishments, and incentivize managers to achieve high performance. 
As has been noted, many nations have created an autonomous regulator as an important first 
step in the reform process. The next action item involves establishing a national benchmark system to 
monitor performance. A third action item is to create incentives through intergovernmental transfers. 
Funds should not be made available to utilities without clear evidence that the public money will be 
utilized in a cost effective manner. While doling out money to politically powerful regions or cities 
may enhance the election prospects of politicians, such transfers are unlikely to truly improve utility 
performance since underlying incentives are blunted. Another recommendation is to promote 
workshops attended by multiple stakeholders. Genuine reform must be broad-based if it is to be 
sustainable. The fifth action is to establish government as a guarantor for utility performance. Of 
course, this step requires KPIs before and after new utility initiatives. The sixth action step involves 
the establishment of performance-based agreements between the owner (the state or municipality) and 
the utility (Board of Directors and CEO). This last point basically means that governance must be 
performance-oriented and transparent, rather than politically-driven and opaque (which characterizes 
poorly-performing SOEs). 
As Love (2010) points out, there is evidence that linking governance to improved 
performance is not a simple process. Some analysts argue that governance improves outcomes, while 
others assert that improved performance leads to changes in governance. While the jury is still out on 
causation, it is hard to argue that governance does not matter. There are too many case studies in the 
water services sector where changes in institutional arrangements (including corporatization, 
independent Boards of Directors, and external oversight via regulatory commissions) are associated 
with dramatic improvements in performance to ignore this instrument for reform. 
The governance structure of SOEs in water and electricity in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been given some attention recently. Andrés, Guasch and Azumendi (2011) develop “an 
aggregate measure of corporate governance and six salient aspects of their design: board, chief 
executive officer, performance orientation, management, legal framework, and 
transparency/disclosure. The results indicate the need for improvement in areas such as the selection 
and appointment of directors to the board and the performance-orientation of the enterprises ... The 
paper finds a positive correlation between corporate governance and the utilities’ performance. 
Among the different aspects of corporate governance, performance orientation and professional 
management seem to be the highest contributors to well-performing ... [SOEs]”. 
By restructuring the internal governance system of SOEs, corporatization may enhance 
efficiency by affecting the incentives and objectives of managers by tightly linking firm performance 
with the evaluation and remuneration of managers. Corporatized firms with low performance had 
greater turnover of managers than non-corporatized enterprises with comparably low performance. 
This finding suggests that separating the entity delivering services from the municipality or ministry 
leads to pressure for managers to perform at higher levels; those that did not perform lost their jobs 
(increasing managerial turnover). Unlike managerial turnover stemming from political pressures (and 
the associated lost expertise and institutional memory), firing managers whose companies have weak 
performance is a way to improve management (and corporate performance). The restructuring of 
Chinese SOEs provides empirical evidence that incentive contracts and corporatization can improve 
the performance of SOEs by strengthening worker incentives even without changing the ownership of 
enterprises (Groves and others, 1994; Aivazian, Ge and Qiu, 2005a and 2005b). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
regulatory rules and an evaluation of sector performance. The concluding sections examine the public service 
obligations of utilities and the role of regulation in improving performance. 
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2. Elements promoting good governance 
A study of the Ugandan case establishes a solid argument that reform initiatives can be effective in 
improving utility performance (Mugisha and Berg, 2008). The elements are summarized below and 
developed in greater detail in the way the principles were applied in the case of NWSC (see annex 1) 
and for the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) in Cambodia (see annex 2): 
 Independent directors: The role of the utility’s Board of Directors is a topic that is 
under-studied, yet it surely belongs on the list of issues warranting greater attention. If 
those monitoring and evaluating management (on behalf of the owners—the nation or the 
municipality) are driven by political concerns, they will tend to have a short term view of 
outcomes: keep tariffs low, “do not rock the boat”, and leave technical management alone 
since “they know best”. Certainly, regular interference by Directors is to be avoided: let 
managers do their job. However, if business plans and executive performance are not 
monitored, then the Board’s governance responsibilities are abrogated. Little is known 
about the selection process, retention, and other aspects of the boards of state-owned 
water utilities (assuming that they are, indeed, corporatized).11 However, best practice 
suggests that having highly respected representatives of different professions (law, 
engineering, business, and accounting, for example) can promote healthy discussions and 
more careful reviews of management performance (Vagliasindi, 2008b). Note that if 
Board members primarily come from (and return to) the realm of politics, they are likely 
to be more concerned with future political opportunities (and so will tend to be 
“captured” by those making the appointments) (Bohoslavsky, 2011). 
 Managerial commercial orientation: If the utility is fully embedded in a ministry or 
within a municipality, the likelihood that its managers will have a commercial orientation 
is reduced. A focus on cost-containment requires that financial sustainability be 
emphasized rather than (current) social concerns, since future performance will be weak 
if the utility acts like a charitable organization. This point runs counter to the orientation 
of many water utilities. Yet waving the flag of “social needs” over utility operations does 
not justify the inefficiencies that characterize many SOEs and municipal water utilities. 
In fact, those who speak loudest on behalf of a “social orientation” are often the same 
ones who appoint politically-connected individuals to positions of responsibility in 
utilities: managers who lack the expertise and professionalism required for making sound 
business decisions. 
 Clarity of roles: Within the utility, each job description requires careful work. An 
organizational chart is only useful to the extent that it reflects actual interactions. If the 
enterprise consists of silos that hardly interact (engineering vs. sales, for example) then 
customer-orientation becomes subservient to political in-fighting. Promoting interactions 
and learning among different units contributes to improved performance (Alfaro, 2009). 
 Coherence among objectives: If managers have not prioritized objectives, there is likely 
to be some inconsistency in decision-making. Keeping tariffs low is one popular 
objective, but it is totally inconsistent with expanding service coverage to the poor 
(unless a donor or government provides funds consistently over time). Thus, there is a 
clear need for a business plan that reflects reality. Similarly, a customer orientation 
promotes community and trust and supports the legitimacy of the water utility activities. 
 Internal performance incentives: Annex 1 documents how NWSC utilized incentives to 
meet targets. A strong case can be made that incentives and information are the 
                                                        
11 See Bohoslavsky (2011) for more details on appointment processes and monitoring as applied to the state-owned 
water supply and sewerage company Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA). 
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cornerstones of good performance—both require that governance systems monitor trends 
over time and that Boards take action when there is weak performance. One objective of 
a benchmarking study is to measure productivity and efficiency so that the analyst can 
make comparisons: Productivity considers the link between utility inputs and outputs. 
Efficiency is related to productivity, but it involves establishing a standard and 
determining how close the firm comes to meeting that standard: how far is the utility 
from “efficient practice”? 
 Integrated information system: Data represent the raw material for decision-making. 
Investment decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. Maintenance requires an asset registry 
and information about reported leaks and customer complaints. Multi-period information 
on operations and financial conditions is essential for sound decision-making. Retaining 
historical data provides analysts with the opportunity to identify trends and conduct more 
robust statistical analyses. When managers make investment and operational decisions, 
they need to be clear about the objectives of the project, the techniques being used, and 
the level of detail required for the dataset. The absence of such specificity limits 
accountability and diminishes organizational learning. 
 Business plan: Together, objectives, past outcomes, and expected revenues, costs, and 
other outlays serve as the basis for a business plan. Customer usage data and population 
growth can be used for forecasting likely future demand. Business plans serve as reality 
checks for decision-makers: are the cash flows reasonable and will the operational and 
expansion targets be met under current financial constraints? Will quality of service be 
improved under the business plan? This element of utility governance reinforces the need 
for a commercial orientation and for trained engineers and managers who can develop a 
sound business plan. 
 Staff participation: Staff buy-in is important for setting goals and developing incentives. 
Their support requires that they have input into the business plan, performance 
incentives, and other aspects of utility operations. A top-down approach is not an 
effective way to run a complex organization where information is widely diffused and 
those in closest contact with customers and operations need to have a voice in how things 
are done. Given the potential importance of political appointments, there can be a lack of 
continuity within the regulatory agency. Also, staff training and capacity building may be 
given inadequate attention by top management. 
How these elements of governance and utility organization led to decisions that improved a 
utility’s performance is best illustrated by examining success stories. However, the task of regulation 
becomes more difficult if governance mechanisms are highly politicized, and non-transparent. An 
autonomous regulatory agency can still contribute to improving performance, but only to the extent 
that it can promote transparency unilaterally. However, if the government is intent on maintaining the 
status quo—resulting in poor performance—then the regulator is placed in a very weak position. The 
agency can at least attempt to evaluate business plans and to bring poor performance to the attention 
of citizens/voters. Even then, without political support for reform initiatives, there is likely to be a loss 
of agency funding, loss of skilled staff (who want more scope for their talents), and continued weak 
sector performance. 
B. SOE utility substance 
Clearly, the regulator needs to avoid micro-management. However, it is certainly legitimate for the 
regulator to monitor the processes utilized by managers to set targets and to evaluate the performance 
of different divisions within the utility. In some cases, the substance of utility decision-making has 
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been strong without the presence of an autonomous regulator, but with a Board of Directors that 
ensures compliance with annual performance contracts. Such cases underscore the point that sound 
regulatory institutions are not absolutely necessary for outstanding utility performance. However, 
external governance must then enter through the back door via a Board of Directors that is committed 
to de-politicizing managerial decisions. 
1. High performing utilities 
Berg and Muhairwe (2009) explored the steps taken by one water utility to become high-performing. 
Eight tasks were identified: (1) identify trends so that past performance is understood; (2) establish 
baselines documenting current performance; (3) select measurable goals as challenging (but 
achievable) targets; (4) design incentives to reward teams for meeting those objectives; (5) establish 
lines of communication to promote information-sharing internally; (6) develop and implement 
strategies for dealing with external developments and threats; (7) ensure accountability by assigning 
responsibilities to leaders and teams; and (8) review results within a reasonable timeframe to evaluate 
process implementation, which takes us back to identifying trends again. 
There are many comparable “lists” of steps for organizational transformation: these happen to 
fit experience in Uganda. For example Baliga and Santalainen (2006) focus on “strategic reorientation, 
shifts in resource acquisition logic, workforce rationalization and renewal, and changing 
organizational configuration”. Thus, although the eight elements used here provide a framework for 
surveying strategies for change, other systems can be useful as well. The process of moving from a 
low to a high performing entity is disruptive for the organization and potentially dangerous to those 
who are committed to changing the status quo: although leaders are catalysts for creating a new 
organizational culture that promotes improved performance, many other factors also contribute to 
success or failure. 
Rouse (2007) uses the case of private water utilities in England and Wales as evidence of how 
consolidation, corporatization, benchmarking (yardstick competition) and regulatory incentives for 
cost containment can yield benefits to consumers. As noted, those incentives are more easily 
established when owners pressure managers to keep costs down (and dividends up). Annex 1 contains 
a more detailed examination of the steps that can be taken to improve utility performance of a SOE, 
based on the Uganda case. Another example of significant achievements occurred Phnom Penh (see 
annex 2), where the management team understood that inefficiencies were neither due to the problem 
of scarcity of water resources nor to insufficient financing, but were caused by the lack of good 
governance. Now the water utility provides excellent service and has become financially self-
sufficient in terms of operations and investments. Annex 4 summarizes lessons from South Asia, 
related to transparency and citizen participation. 
2. Capacity building 
Figure 4 provides a more comprehensive flow diagram of the many decision-issues facing managers. 
It underscores the importance of strong capacity-building within the SOE if performance is, indeed, to 
improve over time. In particular, sources of data for performance benchmarking are highlighted, since 
these become the targets for managers and establish the foundation for good incentives. Note that the 
top part of the diagram identifies the key inputs utilized by water utilities: labour, energy, and other 
variable inputs, physical network assets (inherited by current managers), and water resources. As one 
expert said, “A regulatory requirement for public utilities to produce an auditable asset management 
plan with a clear understanding of the challenge of asset renewal (if not yet a clear funding route) is a 
significant step forward towards improved performance and one that can be achieved, at least to a 
relevant initial level of accuracy, even in situations with weak institutional capital. Without it there 
can be no confidence in any business plan or subsequent tariff setting”. This point underscores the 
need for certified auditors for the income statement and balance sheet, an asset registry, and for a 
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business plan. The condition of assets affects non-revenue water, water quality, and other dimensions 
of utility performance. A strong regulator is in a position to begin an evaluation as to whether 
production capacity is, indeed, being adequately maintained. Such regulatory monitoring programs do 
not involve micro-management: such activities are part of the organization’s oversight responsibilities. 
Density, geography, topology, and customers’ ability to pay are all beyond managerial 
control, but these factors certainly affect costs and revenue flows. The production processes include 
pumping, transport, filtration, purification, treatment, network maintenance, billing and collections, 
and general processes (such as system planning, staff recruitment, and consumer relations). These 
elements comprise the “business” of providing utility services, with network expansion dependent 
upon external financial funds and tariffs (and collections) that bring in enough money to cover 
operating expenses. The rest of figure 4 looks at the “outputs” of the utility and the associated cash 
flows. KPIs are highlighted to show where data would need to be collected and reported. 
FIGURE 4 
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IV. Best practice: benchmarking 
and conflict resolution 
The current report on SOEs and municipal water utilities has emphasized benchmarking as a tool for 
regulating (and managing) publicly-owned utilities: information can be used to develop targets (set by 
the regulator, consistent with public policy). For example, in the case of the Netherlands, KPI data 
collected by VEWIN is published resulting in “naming and shaming” those water utilities with weak 
trends in performance.12 In addition, data can establish a foundation for resolving differences of 
opinion about actual and potential performance (in terms of network expansion, prices, and returns). 
The promotion of improved SOE performance requires that conflicts be identified and 
resolved in a timely fashion. If the arrangements are not acceptable to political leaders and to citizens 
(or if disagreements are not addressed in open forums), the situation will not be sustainable. The key 
point is that while public policy is ultimately the domain of the government and current elected 
officials, its implementation is up to the regulatory agency. The task of the agency is to identify 
conflicts arising from different interpretations of information, different interests (like customers who 
are receiving service and those who are not), inconsistencies regarding policy objectives, and 
disagreements among government agencies (including SOEs and the regulator). Thus, one of the 
regulator’s responsibilities is to ensure that decision-makers have the necessary facts (regarding costs, 
demand forecasts, and capital flows) and that all options have been considered before decisions are 
made. Some might argue that these are not roles for a regulatory agency. Indeed, playing a leadership 
role in bringing water service issues to the fore can be dangerous. 
Ultimately, public policy-makers must set the agenda. However, the water sector regulator 
can play a supporting role in educating the general public and policy-makers about water services 
issues. The regulator is a natural advocate for efficiency and for documenting performance trends. As 
such, participating in processes that promote conflict resolution is a task for the sector regulator. 
                                                        
12 The Netherlands case provides another example of a country without a national regulator, but with strong 
institutional mechanisms that promote transparency. Consolidation of the industry also has contributed to improved 
performance as restructuring facilitated the achievement of economies of scale (Marques, 2010; Ferro and Lentini, 
2010 and 2011). 
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A. Sources of conflict 
There are four potential sources of conflict in the design and implementation of water sector policies 
(Berg, 2007): 
 factual (cognitive) conflicts (based on technical disagreements regarding the analysis 
and interpretation of performance data); 
 interest conflicts (where different groups—utilities, customers, un-served citizens, sub-
national governments, and unions—benefit or lose, depending on the decision); 
 values conflicts (involving ideological and religious differences or differential 
preferences for water sector outcomes); and 
 authority conflicts (reflecting jurisdictional disputes over who has the final “say”). 
Identifying and resolving these conflicts is central to performance improvement. While the 
regulator of state or municipally-owned water supply and sanitation systems may not take the lead in 
resolving these conflicts, the regulator can play a role in the process. Stakeholders must have a clear 
understanding of facts, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities. The regulatory agency is unlikely 
to resolve the conflicts, but it must be in a position to articulate the issues, provide information where 
appropriate, and make citizens aware of the need for political resolution of issues. So the regulator 
must be politically aware, but not political. That is one key reason why autonomy is such an important 
principle in the design of the regulatory agency: if it is totally beholden to current political interests 
and subject to daily intervention, the leaders of the regulatory commission will neither be willing nor 
able to perform this important function. 
Resolving the four conflicts involves two types of work: technical and adaptive. Figure 5 
indicates how the four types of conflict are addressed by different types of activities. 
FIGURE 5 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION MATRIX 
 
Source: Jamison and Castaneda (2011). 
B. Regulatory governance for conflict resolution 
The following points underscore how information and research provided by the regulator can play a 
role in promoting stronger governance and improved water utility performance. 
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1. Research: What are the facts? 
It is said that everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but not their own facts. This report highlights 
data collection as essential if one is to document relative utility performance, reward those who are on 
the efficiency frontier, and identify those who are far inside the frontier. Given the political clout of 
SOEs and municipal utilities, the regulator’s most important tool involves pressing for transparency: 
information on trends and relative performance brings dialogues back to reality. Public hearings bring 
out information regarding performance, business plans, and internal incentives. Information can 
mobilize public opinion and hold government ministries or municipal boards accountable for sector 
outcomes. Both national development banks and private investors focus on the likelihood that funds 
will be used productively, providing social (and private) returns on investments. International donors 
should apply similar standards to avoid wasting scarce capital and to provide incentives for utilities to 
move towards best practice. However, without facts, investors and donors are in no position to supply 
funds for the most productive infrastructure initiatives. National development banks and government 
budgets have other uses for funds as well—in education, hospitals, and roads. Without evidence of 
good performance in water services, other claims on scarce government resources are likely to be 
more compelling. In addition, allocations across sectors also consider evidence regarding the direct 
and indirect benefits associated with expanded water services. Four areas are particularly important: 
 Public information: Making information available to the public promotes better 
performance. Customers’ awareness of baselines and trends improves their understanding 
of what is feasible and can put citizen pressure on managers. If the utility is municipally-
owned, data on trends for KPIs can direct attention to utility management in local 
political campaigns. For national or state-owned water utilities, the availability of 
comparative information can be used by political challengers as evidence of 
mismanagement. One rationale for public ownership (if not operation) is that water 
services are such important components of life: access to water services is a human right. 
At the same time, water services are commodities: if managers are driven completely by 
short term political considerations rather than commercial concerns (and financial 
sustainability), then the utility becomes a stagnant institution with low quality, high cost 
service. Even if the tariff is low, the system will be unsustainable; the business plan is 
inadequate to meet the needs of citizens. Service delayed is service denied. 
 Managerial information: Small companies and entities need support to obtain and to use 
data for benchmarking purposes. Such data is first and foremost a managerial 
requirement—managers can only manage what they measure. Records document what 
has happened in the past: those data provide a baseline for future developments. Without 
underlying income statements, balance sheets, and operating statistics, feasible business 
plans cannot be developed. In highly decentralized utility systems, the lack of managerial 
capacity and absence of up-to-date information systems serves as a brake that delays 
performance improvements. With hundreds of municipal utilities, effective oversight by a 
national regulator is very problematic (given the difficulty of obtaining timely and 
consistent information and applying sanctions) (Jouravlev, 2004; Vergès, 2010; Salinas, 
2011). Local regulation by the municipality has its own set of problems: lack of expertise 
(and sometimes authority) for evaluating performance. Small utilities lack scale 
economies and the engineering expertise necessary for good planning and operational 
efficiency (Ferro and Lentini, 2010 and 2011). In addition, the politics of local control 
(and excessive managerial turnover) limit the professionalization of top management. 
The evaluation of business plans and past performance is one regulatory activity that can 
put pressure on SOEs to improve performance. 
 Performance benchmarking: Regulators should use benchmarking as part of tariff 
review; it can be used as a yardstick for comparing the performance of similar utilities. 
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Penalizing weak performance is difficult in the case of SOEs, since reducing tariffs will 
not put pressure on management. However, getting “league table” information 
(performance indicators and rankings) out to customers, the press, and to donors does 
change the information set available to important stakeholders. If the regulatory agency 
has the political independence (and leadership) that enables it to be an advocate for 
efficiency, a poorly performing system can be transformed—as external stakeholders put 
pressure on management. Bonus pools (from national or local budgets) can be distributed 
based on relative performance, providing an incentive for managers to apply greater 
effort towards cost containment and service quality improvement. If investment funds are 
allocated (in part) using the same criteria, there is likely to be more public pressure for 
better performance and more interest on the part of institutional owners. 
 Data timeliness, consistency and accuracy: One important step for an agency is its 
adherence to schedules. If stakeholders are fully aware of deadlines and the consequences 
of missing deadlines are substantial, then the SOE is more likely to operate as a 
commercialized entity rather than a politicized organization. This means, of course, that 
the water authority, the finance ministry, and other relevant government authorities must 
back up the regulatory commission. If utility managers do not meet deadlines, the 
ministries should take appropriate actions to replace the current utility Board of 
Directors. In the case of municipal utilities, if funds from the national government are 
being allocated to utilities for investment, funding could be contingent on replacing 
managers. It should be clear that internal governance is crucial for the improvement of 
data quality. Of course, improvements cannot be instantaneous, but they should be 
documented. Relevant decision-makers from accounting and information systems need to 
be included in the process to promote both accountability and sound business practices. 
2. Research and negotiation: How should benefits 
and costs be allocated? 
Stakeholders have different interests, despite sharing a concern for the sustainability of the water 
sector. Analysts have found much support for the political economy of regulation (Berg and 
Tschirhart, 1988). This mode of analysis argues that regulatory decisions impose costs and create 
benefits. Even if the net present value of the costs is greater than that of the benefits, if the former are 
spread over many citizens, but the later are concentrated on a few, then the detrimental decision can be 
adopted. The beneficiaries are knowledgeable and well organized: they have the incentive to lobby 
and argue their case, using financial and political resources at their disposal. Those bearing the costs 
are dispersed, poorly organized, and face considerable transaction costs for collective action. They are 
either unaware of the full long term consequences of the regulatory decision or the costs are small on a 
per capita basis. Similarly, even if the benefits are greater than the costs, those bearing the costs (such 
as a union’s loss of rigid work rules) are in a position to block change. 
Here, the role of the regulator is to ensure that parties are aware of the full implications of 
decisions. Wide participation coupled with regulatory advocacy for efficiency and fairness can 
improve the likelihood of beneficial rulings. The price of water services to different customer 
categories, rate structures, network expansion and other elements of SOE behaviour all come under 
the oversight of the regulatory agency. This means that the regulator is in a position to balance the 
interests of different stakeholders, including those not sitting at the table: both at present (those 
without access to services) and in the future (the children and grandchildren of today’s citizen-voters). 
An excessively low tariff may be politically popular today, but it means that the SOE either must 
obtain funds from other sources for investment or that service quality and coverage will deteriorate. 
 Data definitions and business plans: Regulators can insist upon the establishment of a 
uniform system of accounts. Clear definitions of operating and financial terms enable 
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comparisons to be made across utilities and over time. Without a robust accounting 
framework, external audits will not be feasible. Furthermore, any data provided by the 
utility will be inconsistent and not reflect the underlying economic valuation of the assets. 
The annual reports for some SOEs in the region have not been audited for five years or 
more. This situation is shameful. Information helps both the operator and the regulator; 
furthermore, this process need not be adversarial (although managers and politicians may 
feel threatened by transparency). Nevertheless, clear definitions and a logical structure for 
data collection and verification are key factors for performance enhancement. Without 
asset management planning, the utility’s future production capabilities will be weakened. 
These financial and operating reports become the foundation for transparency, which is 
fundamental for achieving citizen confidence in the system. 
 Performance improvements and incentives: Water supply and sanitation services 
present win-win possibilities for various stakeholders. As better information becomes a 
by-product of operations, the process leads to improved performance. Analysis of 
performance indicators helps managers save resources by identifying possible problems 
in the production process: efforts can be directed in a more focused manner. Economic 
incentives used by regulators work differently on private and public companies: this 
observation should influence what particular regulatory policies are pursued. Some 
policies will be similar, such as those related to accountability, transparency, and citizen 
participation. Some regulatory policies will be different, like those associated with social 
objectives and supporting government policy to corporatize and then commercialize a 
SOE. All areas require careful analysis, including evaluating the impacts of different 
types of incentives, for example choosing between cost of service regulation and high-
powered incentives based on price caps. The initial tariffs, opportunities for cost 
containment, and risk allocation all affect this choice. If current prices are far below 
operating cost for the SOE, the issue is not limiting the exercise of market power, but 
convincing key stakeholders that the long term sustainability of the water service depends 
on raising tariffs over time and on improving production efficiency. A good first step 
involves focusing on collection rates and non-revenue water, since they enhance cash-
flows, improvements can be targeted and rewarded (via management and staff bonuses), 
and their associated KPIs can be tracked. Finally, if water service is under-funded, then 
the problem of access to sewerage services and wastewater treatment becomes much 
more difficult to address. 
 Comprehensive performance evaluation: The sector regulator is in a position to 
provide reports to public policy-makers on how the nation’s water utilities perform 
relative to those in neighbouring countries in comparable socioeconomic situations. Such 
reports should include the consequences of these differences for the country in terms of 
public health, conditions for economic development, environmental protection and 
poverty reduction. Benchmarking using KPIs for water utilities at a country level yields 
rankings that provide policy-makers with a factual basis for analyzing, evaluating, and 
rewarding service providers’ performance. However, benchmarking needs to be 
comprehensive; it should cover social information as well as utility financial and 
operational data. Social information goes beyond production processes to include 
coverage, access for the poor, water resources sustainability, and environmental impacts 
of inadequate mechanisms for sanitation. In addition, data on local conditions affecting 
costs that are beyond management’s control need to be taken into account for 
comparisons to be robust. If water services are declared to be a national priority in 
developing nations, the trends on hydrological and environmental sustainability need to 
be incorporated into the public discussion. Best practice involves a specialized agency for 
managing water resources (Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006; Hantke-Domas, 2011 and 
2013). Although the sector regulator should not normally be responsible for water 
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allocation, it can serve as a lead agency in creating task forces that hold the political 
system accountable for comprehensive system performance. For example, related reports 
could provide a full assessment of all the benefits and costs of new water quality and 
pollution standards; such studies should consider the effects of new standards on water 
supply and sewerage tariffs. In addition, such task forces should seek input from agencies 
who have to monitor the standards and from consumers who have to pay for 
environmental upgrades. 
3. Adaptive work: What is important? 
People in government ministries, utilities, regulatory agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
with other affiliations place different emphasis on the pace and pattern of network expansion and 
service quality improvements; however, there is no doubt that it is important to maintain dialogues 
within nations so stakeholders can understand the concerns of one another. Thus, a potentially useful 
role of the regulatory agency is to provide opportunities for stakeholders to engage in conversations 
that address fundamental issues. 
 Establishing priorities: Identification and prioritization of goals is crucial in the 
regulatory process: if improvements in sector performance cannot be documented, the 
system loses legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Furthermore, targets need to be realistic 
and specific, so decision-makers can be held accountable for sector performance. Those 
in charge of formulating public policy establish priorities and regulators implement those 
policies. Politicians sometimes identify broad objectives (fairness/social justice and 
efficiency) without considering how those objectives are to be measured, balanced and 
monitored. The regulatory agency can at least develop guidelines interpreting the law, 
leaving it to the political system to add precision if the agency has not balanced 
objectives in a way supported by the citizenry. Over time, if SOE performance is 
improving and other sector indictors are moving in the right direction, citizens will gain 
confidence in policy-makers and in the way the regulator is implementing public policy. 
Related to the issue of priorities are the necessary interactions with other agencies. For 
example, the sector regulator should emphasize to the environmental regulators the 
importance of carrying out adequate economic analysis before the adoption of more 
stringent standards (Jouravlev, 2000). Taking initiative for inter-agency coordination is 
one way the regulator can exercise leadership in bringing issues to the fore. 
 Believing is seeing: Our preconceptions shape (and even determine) our perceptions. 
Getting fundamental values out in the open can help stakeholders see areas for 
collaboration and consensus. Being grounded in the reality of business plans, best 
practice, and financial constraints can help stakeholders understand what must be given 
up to achieve particular objectives. This point underscores the need for both the regulator 
and the SOE to communicate with stakeholders. Reports, workshops, news interviews, 
hearings, and public statements—there are many venues for keeping a spotlight on water 
services. “When nothing is said, little gets done”. Thus, the regulator should encourage 
water utilities to research the views of their customers—to determine customer priorities. 
Also, the sector regulator must impress on both environmental regulators and water 
companies the need to arrive at efficient solutions in which quality and environmental 
objectives are achieved in cost effective ways (Jouravlev, 2000). 
 Cumulative improvements: Data reveal whether we are meeting our goals. 
Benchmarking is a valuable tool for the operator; it is an incremental process involving 
steps that strengthen organizational capabilities. Once basic information has been 
processed, the experience yields improvements in procedures as managers better 
understand information flows and performance outcomes in segments of the utility. Clear 
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and timely information helps managers identify emerging problems—reducing delayed 
responses. All of this, of course, implies that internal incentives exist to act on 
information. Managers respond to incentives. If there are no rewards for meeting targets 
and no penalties for missing them, performance will be weak. Thus, the internal 
governance system must develop ways to move the organization towards a culture of 
professionalism and excellence. Such a change requires leadership within the utility and a 
Board of Directors that values and rewards high performance. 
 Urban/rural initiatives: Whether resources will actually be utilized for network 
expansion and improved access depends on whether public policy actually supports such 
initiatives. The high costs and low political visibility of serving dispersed populations 
make it difficult to develop programs that impact rural areas (Carrasco, 2012 and 2011). 
Given the limited ability of the very poor to pay for water (let alone sewerage), some 
external funding (from national, state, local or donor budgets) will be needed to target the 
urban poor and rural areas. For managers, urban systems have the cost advantages of 
density related to economies of scale; for elected officials, large cities have political 
clout, as public protests are easier to organize. Small towns and rural areas are often 
neglected. Benchmarking should include rural areas to ensure that policy-makers are 
aware of resource allocation within the water service sector. 
4. Adaptive work: Who has jurisdiction? 
Currently, the jurisdictional overlaps and gaps are significant in many countries. That can result in 
duplicative (and sometimes, conflicting) rules that raise compliance costs. In other cases, both 
agencies hold the other one responsible for some tasks so problems remain unaddressed. The OECD 
(2012) report identified administrative and information gaps as two issues facing the water service 
sector—particularly in the context of SOEs. Capacity to collect and analyze data is weak. In addition, 
authority conflicts distract agencies and managers from doing their jobs: harming sector performance. 
 Data and governance frameworks: Utilities need comprehensive information systems 
in order to improve data quality and provide timely information. Such systems need not 
involve highly advanced information technologies that integrate geographical information 
systems (GIS) with real-time measurement of system performance. Rather, a good 
starting point involves careful reporting of basic data to a centralized data library 
(according to consistent and standardized definitions and protocols). This point is 
particularly relevant in those nations that have moved to decentralized service provision. 
In principle, delegating operational and financial authority to municipalities has the 
theoretical advantage13 of placing authority closest to those affected by decisions. 
However, smaller cities, in particular, often lack the information systems and technical 
expertise to oversee municipal utilities. The lack of professionalism and weak governance 
leads to poor performance. Furthermore, within a municipality political patronage 
remains an issue: without transparency, local citizens lack the ability to compare their 
utility’s performance with comparable systems, leaving politicians to use the utility for 
political pay-offs. One could argue that national data systems are essential if investment 
funds are going to be allocated to managers who use the money efficiently. 
 Information is an antidote to abusive use of power: Those currently controlling access 
to information must be convinced of the benefits of a centralized (and accessible) 
database that helps avoid duplication of effort. A changed organizational culture is as 
                                                        
13 Decentralization of service provision, especially to the municipal level, has many important practical drawbacks 
(including loss of scale economies, difficulties for effective regulation, impediments for watershed management 
and disincentives for water pollution control) (Jouravlev, 2003b and 2004; Ferro and Lentini, 2010 and 2011). 
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important as developing technical capabilities. The latter can be accomplished via 
training programs; however, these are necessary, but not sufficient, for performance 
improvements. To put this in simple terms: the lack of ten years of audited data for a SOE 
can be used to place the burden of proof on management that it is performing well. It is 
generally best to presume “innocent until proven guilty”, but when public resources are 
being expended and there is minimal documentation on how those outlays on inputs 
relate to performance, managers should be required to explain why they are not treating 
the utility like a commercial entity. Are the bidding processes appropriate? Are 
recruitment and retention practices for staff reasonable? Do internal incentives promote 
efficiency? Finally, if the governance system involves elected officials (such as a 
municipal council) providing oversight, does that regulatory system truly promote good 
performance by the municipal utility and what evidence is there that performance is 
actually improving? These questions suggest that those controlling information may not 
want the general public to have data or that tariffs are so low that the utility cannot even 
afford to gather data necessary to make sound decisions.14 
 Clarify jurisdictional responsibilities: Previous studies (OECD, 2012) underscore the 
importance of having clearly defined authority. When there are overlapping 
responsibilities, agencies either engage in turf wars or blame one another for 
shortcomings when evidence of poor performance becomes overwhelming. The regulator 
is in a position to organize task forces or to hold workshops to get the issues out into the 
open. Battles between national, state (provincial) and local (municipal) authorities are 
generally over which entity has the final say on issues affecting constituencies. The SOE 
may have historical ties to the sectoral ministry or to local political interests. Such links 
might be used to blunt or counter the impact of regulatory rulings. 
Based on the observations presented here, legal frameworks applicable to a water utility 
regulator and a SOE should: 
 Facilitate fact-finding: Require data reporting by operators (promoting transparency and 
reducing information asymmetries). 
 Ensure institutional capacity: Provide authorities with the resources to attract and retain 
professional staff who can effectively interact with all stakeholders. 
 Identify and prioritize performance objectives: Ensure that those setting public policy 
are clear about their goals and that they are held accountable for promises made regarding 
related initiatives. 
 Define the roles and responsibilities of different entities: Promote clarity and 
accountability in the institutional division of labour. 
Attention to these four features enables the legal framework for regulating water and 
sewerage systems to address fundamental issues, and ultimately, to reduce conflicts—contributing to a 
more stable and predictable public policy environment. 
                                                        
14 The fundamental problem of information asymmetry in principal-agent situations has been examined in numerous 
academic studies (see Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). 
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V. Key lessons and conclusions 
A. Key lessons for utility regulation 
The first rule of medicine is “Do no harm”. The same rule applies to public policy reform. Careful 
diagnoses of problems and analyses of the likely impacts of different policy options can limit the 
likelihood that truly “bad” policies will be adopted. The standards for sound analysis include 
objectivity, consideration of institutional constraints, and benchmarking against the performance of 
others. Ultimately, one would expect public policy recommendations by experts to play a positive role 
in the development and implementation of water services policy. 
If the adoption of promising reform initiatives has been blocked by those who benefit from 
the current system, reform leaders need to identify allies who can neutralize the powerful beneficiaries 
of a dysfunctional system. Kingdom and van Ginneken (2008) note that a stakeholder analysis and 
scenario building represent good steps towards this process. They also observe that the key weakness 
of regulators involves limited availability of necessary authority: “Independent regulation of public 
utilities has often failed to deliver the expected outcomes. The principal reason is the inability to apply 
sanctions. Effective regulation requires the ability to reward good performance and punish poor 
performance ... Without rewards and sanctions, the regulatory mechanisms used to control private 
utilities are unlikely to be effective in changing the behaviour of publicly-owned water utilities”. 
Devising rewards and penalties for managers of SOEs and municipal utilities represents a key 
challenge for those seeking to improve sector performance. Researchers have placed information at 
the top of the list of tasks for documenting trends, establishing baselines, and developing forecasts of 
cash flows. In particular, the financial sustainability of utilities cannot be determined in the absence of 
systematic record keeping. Nevertheless, there are substantial barriers that must be removed for 
incentives to be aligned to actually collect useful information. Abysmal performance in information 
collection and dissemination is understandable: knowledge (and access to information) is power. Key 
stakeholders who do not want reform know that one way to delay it is to ensure that information on 
financial, engineering, and economic performance is not available. In large cities with local regulation, 
the utility management may not wish to publish information that reveals poor levels of performance. 
Managers of smaller utilities have that same incentive; and, in addition, such systems are likely to lack 
the capacity and resources to develop decision-relevant information systems. 
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The political economy of regulation suggests that the benefits of the present system (which 
are concentrated upon those in positions of privilege) need not outweigh the aggregate costs to those 
paying for inefficiencies or poor quality service. The costs of a poorly performing regulatory system 
are disbursed across the general populace (and not widely understood at that, given the general lack of 
transparency and information). Thus, regulators need to seek allies in addressing governance issues. In 
some cases, allies will come from outside the water services sector; for example, irrigation, tourism or 
agribusiness—all should be interested in efficient service provision because of positive synergies. 
The linkages between water services and fiscal reform set up a natural alliance between those 
supporting serious measures to improve sector performance (via cost recovery and financial 
sustainability) and the Treasury. Also, water supply and sewerage service improvement and expansion 
facilitate development and promote civic cohesion. One potential role of the sector regulator is to 
establish a clear record of past performance, and the benefits (and costs) of the current situation and of 
the proposed reform for the nation (Hantke-Domas and Jouravlev, 2011). This task includes 
communicating to both the legislative and executive branches the implications of maintaining the 
status quo. 
Few leaders are elected on the basis of promises to enhance economic efficiency. Most make 
promises regarding the importance of social justice: fairness and meeting a variety of stakeholder 
objectives (low tariffs, network expansion, improvement of service quality, and jobs) are usually more 
salient to voters. After elections, the funds and institutional reforms required for performance 
improvements are often set aside. Thus, it is important for the regulator to help the political elite 
understand how existing incentive mechanisms affect sector performance and societal welfare. In 
addition, workshops can help key stakeholders understand the extent to which conflicting policy 
objectives are the source of conflict among different governmental agencies. This study has 
underscored the importance of achieving clarity in the division of responsibilities between the sector 
regulators and the respective ministries. 
Since water service reform is (at its best) accompanied by greater transparency and 
participation by stakeholders, attention must be given to the involvement and education of non-
governmental organizations and various consumer representatives. Of course, there is always the 
danger that such groups be taken over by special interests which then have a platform and social 
legitimacy. That platform might be subsequently abused. Nevertheless, as Dubash (2002) emphasizes, 
it is important to engage civil society in reform initiatives that strengthen the regulatory and corporate 
governance. The promotion of public dialogue is a first step towards getting more comprehensive 
support from key stakeholders. It is also helpful to engage the support of professional groups, such as 
the AIDIS. In some cases, timing is everything. 
The term “window of opportunity” is sometimes used to explain why initiatives are on some 
occasions taken prematurely, without full buy-in from all stakeholders. However, even the presence of 
a reform champion may be inadequate if supporting factors are not present. Economists often 
downplay the role of personalities and leadership in the reform process, preferring to focus on broad 
technological and economic forces. Yet, if institutional constraints are at the core of the problem then 
people who have the charisma or contacts (influence) and motivation to change the system are 
important (McCraw, 1984). 
Reform is, by nature, a “work in progress” that relies on strategy as “a pattern in a stream of 
decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978). The ideas presented here are intended to plant seeds in the minds of 
those who are reflecting on when, where, and why particular reform initiatives worked. Hopefully, the 
observations will lead to some case studies that can document the relative importance of the different 
strategies described here. It may be that country-specific institutional features doomed or supported 
initiatives to improve governance and to increase economic incentives for efficiency. There is still a 
great deal to be learned about with regard to water utility regulation and reform in the presence of 
SOEs and municipal utilities. 
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Rosenzweig, Voll and Pabon-Agudelo (2004) have attempted to explain why international 
reform experience has been relatively unsuccessful in many countries. Their explanations range from 
inadequately planned transitions to the difficulty of changing entrenched mindsets among those who 
are asked to manage restructured or privatized utilities. Their most relevant conclusions are listed 
below to outline the difficulty of reforming regulatory governance and developing better procedures 
for managing utility operations: 
 Recognize the complexity of reform: “Reform ... is a highly complex technical activity 
in a sector of very high political interest and in the midst of strong public antagonisms, 
and involves the transformation of bureaucratic agencies with long histories of political 
interference”. Basically, they emphasize that there are no unique recipes for success. 
 Target early beneficiaries: “Reform has often been directed by parties that are not 
technicians or specialists and that have agendas that go well beyond reform of the sector 
and only limited interest in economic efficiency or improving sector performance”. For 
example, some nations chose privatization as a technique for maximizing revenue for the 
Treasury; however that can slow network expansion, since it takes funds that might 
otherwise have gone directly into water sector infrastructure. Thus, there is less 
investment in improving service quality or increasing connections which would have 
provided political support for reform. In other cases, the need to attract private 
investment was given priority over other considerations, especially the subsequent 
regulation of the markets involved, with a result of weak regulatory frameworks, 
incapable of generating strong incentives for efficiency (Jouravlev, 2003a and 2004). 
 Understand government strengths and limitations: “Reform is often pursued by 
governments that lack a clear understanding of the models, their requirements, and the 
implications for the necessary and proper role of government. Not surprisingly, the 
attempts mostly failed”. Just as market failures can justify government intervention, 
potential government failures should be recognized when developing the reform package. 
For example, government failures arise if agencies lack human capital, if the judicial 
system cannot handle appeals promptly, or if the legislature (or executive) is unwilling to 
delegate authority to those implementing reforms. 
 Appreciate the roles of funding agencies and governments: There is evidence that 
funding agencies tend to pressure for reform (supply-push) even when national and local 
governments (or citizens) do not support it (absence of demand-pull). Institutional 
arrangements that are imposed from the outside are bound to lack strong support. It is 
useful to ask whether particular governments are truly interested in meeting agreed-upon 
commitments. Investors and other stakeholders will look at the government track record 
to determine whether there is a genuine interest in (and support for) reform. Similarly, 
international financial institutions often have multiple objectives associated with country 
water infrastructure programs: “Funding agencies must rely on technical experts rather 
than agency imperatives or preconceptions in setting their prescriptions for reform”. This 
observation underscores the undesirability of forcing reforms through grants or loans 
when there is no local support for change or for a specific reform. Neither ideological nor 
imposed policies are likely to be implemented in a serious way. 
 Base reform on reality and create a transition plan: “Ground realities must be 
incorporated into the selection and implementation of a reform model”. A related issue is 
whether current water sector infrastructure managers should be retained or bought off. 
Poor performance can often be attributed to poor management and weak incentives. 
Some analysts argue that people who have continued to mess things up should not be 
asked to clean up the mess. The current situation represents equilibrium: some citizens, 
some politicians, some managers, and some employees are content with present 
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arrangements—even if the system is performing poorly for the nation. If this reality is not 
recognized, reform cannot succeed. Another issue is how the success of a reform is to be 
monitored: what are the indicators of success? “A transition plan must be developed that 
will allow the sector to move from its current state to the reformed end-state without 
alienating customers or undermining the reform”. 
The link between today’s performance (the baseline) and desired performance (the vision) is 
totally dependent upon devising a reform strategy that is based on reality and reflects shared 
objectives—recognizing the roles of different types of institutions (formal organizations like the 
regulatory agency, social structures like political parties, and support systems, including civil service 
and citizen attitudes). Clarity about objectives is a key part of the governance reform process, 
requiring communication and the development of a consensus regarding what is both possible and 
desirable. Regulation is a mechanism for conflict resolution, although the mere existence of a new 
centre of initiative can also contribute to jealousies and petty power-struggles at all levels. 
B. Conclusions 
Sustainable sector outcomes generally reflect the principles of a sound regulatory system design: 
coherence, creativity, communication, collaboration, consultation, and credibility. These principles 
provide the foundation for effective strategies that strengthen governance and that engage the public 
and policymakers: 
 Coherence: Revenues, sources of investment funds, operating costs, output levels, and 
service quality are interdependent. Regulators need to establish the tariffs according to 
projected water service delivery and levels of service quality. At the same time, 
regulators seek mechanisms for promoting access by low-income consumers: pro-poor 
agenda. Reality-based business plans are crucial for long term financial sustainability of 
water utilities. To set tariffs and evaluate performance requires data from the operating 
utilities and careful analysis by the regulatory authority. In the case of SOEs, historical 
accounting and operating records provide essential evidence regarding trends associated 
with key targets. Regulators must be in a position to certify (and monitor) business plans 
for moving forward. If future cash flows from operations (collections) and financing 
activities (bonds, public funds, or donors) are inadequate for maintenance and planned 
investments, then the regulator should reject the business plan and set up a public 
workshop to develop a realistic business plan. Stakeholders need to be informed of the 
consequences of unrealistic, incoherent plans. Furthermore, these plans need to be 
publicly available on a timely basis, so that affected groups can adjust to developments. 
Regulators have few tools for incentivizing high performance in SOEs, but they can at 
least draw attention to good practices and to ask why targets are not being met. 
 Creativity: Regulators should support incentives for cost-containment and new 
technologies for service providers. If current regulatory arrangements are not yielding 
improved SOE performance, then reports to the legislature should contain 
recommendations that give appropriate tools to the agency. Social tariffs and subsidies 
are required to facilitate universal access to low-income consumers. The non-served 
groups also need to be reached with innovative solutions as operators expand access to 
services. Unrealistic targets only lead to frustrated managers and unhappy citizens. 
 Communication: Regulators are in a position to serve as a catalyst for bringing together 
different water sector stakeholders. Proactive regulators can reduce social conflicts in 
these sectors. Agencies have to consider all stakeholders and their key concerns when 
making decisions. For example, consumers are the first (not the last) to be consulted in 
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network expansion decisions. Regulators need to be able to communicate strategically, 
without being perceived as stepping into the political arena. 
 Collaboration: Regulators need to promote interactions with related agencies and 
organizations; for example, for water supply and sewerage this would include water 
resources managers, municipalities, social service organizations, public health agencies, 
and environmental groups. Furthermore, collaborations with agencies in other countries 
can strengthen regulatory capacity, as lessons and data are shared. For example, the 
Association of Water and Sanitation Regulatory Entities of the Americas (ADERASA) 
serves this role for Latin American water regulators. Such networking is a valuable 
source of experiences and data for international comparisons. 
 Consultation: Promote the creation of consumer advisory boards at the local level. Such 
councils educate opinion leaders and obtain feedback regarding consumer perceptions. 
These groups will not parrot the “regulatory line” but can provide feedback on draft 
decisions. Members of these boards are likely to be opinion leaders who can help educate 
others regarding the trade-offs that must be made to maintain the financial sustainability 
of service providers. Quality choices and decisions regarding the expansion of service 
both require input from citizens. Note that un-served citizens should be included on such 
boards to give a voice to those currently without service. Without broad support, a 
technically competent regulatory agency will find itself marginalized by forces that are 
far stronger. Note, also, that such organizations can also serve as the platforms for 
political activists or others with special interests. So as in most situations, the downsides 
associated with such entities must be recognized. 
 Credibility: Regulators should place a premium on transparency and consistency in the 
regulatory process, since cash flows will be driven by future decisions. The agency’s 
credibility depends heavily on data collection and analysis, adhering to schedules, 
keeping promises, and behaving with integrity. 
These principles are neither new nor original, but when they are ignored by those developing 
and implementing public policy, the results can be damaging. For example, predictability and 
transparency are two elements lacking in many regulatory jurisdictions. Regulators need to be 
consistent in both the process and in the substance of decisions. Transparency implies clear rules and 
functions that give operators confidence in the professionalism of those providing oversight. The 
public is seldom fully aware of current water supply and sewerage policies and rules. Best practice 
regulatory institutions need to take a more active role in educating the public and in communicating 
sector developments to all stakeholders. It is said that “the fewer the facts, the stronger the opinion”. 
One way to reduce the divisive role of rhetoric is to introduce information about the costs and benefits 
of different policy options. In addition, improving governance is the foundation for establishing better 
incentives to promote efficiency. If the regulatory process is transparent, stakeholders (including 
political leaders) will better understand regulatory decisions. 
Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum (2006) emphasize three meta-principles: credibility, 
legitimacy, and transparency. In addition, the authors implicitly recognize efficiency as a fourth 
meta-principle. After all, if policy can create a positive-sum game, then it is easier to get buy-in from 
stakeholders. However, without incentives and penalties poor performance is likely to result. With 
strong incentives (bonus pools, management performance contracts, bonuses for meeting realistic 
targets, and replacement of poorly performing managers), efficiency becomes a serious task for 
managers and staff. Increased efficiency in the sector means that more resources can be devoted to 
poverty alleviation (a pro-poor agenda) without creating new fiscal burdens. While far more 
politicians have run on a platform of fairness than on efficiency, the latter deserves to be highlighted 
in evaluations of regulatory performance. 
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Efficiency and equity are not mutually exclusive: rather, they are complementary 
objectives, though their achievement generally requires a sequential approach to expansion: 
financial sustainability is necessary (but not sufficient) for fairness (Jouravlev, 2009). In addition 
to the potential complementarity of efficiency and social equity, the author would like to underscore a 
few other points that emerge from this review of regulation of state-owned and municipal utilities: 
 Well-performing institutions make information available, implement incentives, and 
evaluate performance. 
 Insulation from daily political pressures and regulatory micro-management is necessary 
for strong performance. 
 Access to benchmarking information provides a foundation for establishing better 
external and internal governance and incentives. 
 Professionalism and engineering expertise are necessary for good planning and 
operational efficiency. 
 Continuity and accountability for both utilities and their oversight agencies is essential 
for long term sustainability. 
 The utility’s Board of Directors is a key component of the governance system: it needs to 
track and incentivize good performance. 
 Stakeholder participation in the regulatory process promotes the exchange of ideas 
necessary to identify win-win options and develop consensus among key groups. 
 Political support for reform initiatives helps agency funding and the attraction and 
retention of strong leadership and skilled staff. 
The extent to which these activities are not occurring in any particular jurisdiction is evidence 
that reforms are necessary for improving utility performance. 
The regulator (whether it be a municipal commission or a multi-sector national regulatory 
agency) is just one actor among many. That means that the agency must identify allies and opponents 
when trying to improve sector performance. Performance will not improve if the political will does 
not support reforms. In some jurisdictions, regulators tend to be very passive—not wanting to take 
initiative or just being apprehensive about becoming a target for politicians to attack. Yet, even if the 
agency is following “best practice” by being transparent, promoting participation (through workshops 
and hearings), and meeting deadlines, if it is not taking initiatives (within the law), then citizens will 
continue to experience poor service from water utilities. Similarly, the push for decentralization (to 
help utilities be more accountable locally) is unlikely to improve performance if the local governance 
structures are not strengthened and capacity building not given adequate attention. If local managers 
lack the technical skills and professionalism required for good performance, then the governance 
system should provide opportunities for training and upgrading skills. Publicly available data 
(benchmarking) would be one mechanism for evaluating, incentivizing, and replacing management. 
Ultimately, the credibility and legitimacy of a government agency depend on the acceptance 
and understanding of the regulatory process by the consumers and other stakeholders. The population 
that is expecting to receive services is directly affected by tariffs and quality of service. The impact of 
water sector reform depends on national circumstances, income distribution and growth, and the legal 
system. Legitimacy, and some degree of social acceptance, will only be achieved on a record of 
accomplishments. Staff expertise, learning from regulatory experiences elsewhere, and the use of 
regulatory instruments like benchmarking are the basis for improving performance of SOEs and 
municipal utilities. In addition, as Ian Byatt (2013) the first water sector regulator for England and 
Wales noted, “Regulatory strategy, not detail, is the key to success”. His observation suggests that 
regulators of SOEs and municipal water utilities must be politically aware, without becoming political. 
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Annex 1 
The National Water and Sewerage Company, Uganda, 
case study 
 Identify trends: The first task of a CEO is to bring to light the elements that have led the 
organization to its current state. Awareness of trends provides a context for addressing 
emerging threats, allowing decision-makers to exercise both prudence and confidence in 
attacking the problems identified in the data-gathering process. Such information should 
reveal how the organization has dealt with past financial and market conditions. In 
addition, the process should identify the outcomes associated with past policies; some of 
those policies may not have been explicit but reflected the corporate culture of the time. 
The key is to distil the data into a framework that facilitates pattern analysis, which later 
can be used to develop effective strategies for moving forward. Threats that remain 
hidden can lead to either extreme caution or “business as usual”, neither of which is a 
good way to start a transformation process. 
 Establish baselines: This report has emphasized the fundamental role of data. The 
leadership team of NWSC took this point seriously as it addressed the utility’s financial 
drivers. Parallel to collecting “hard” data regarding past performance, the CEO tried to 
develop a consensus among top managers regarding the consequences of a status quo 
scenario. The situation was basically unsustainable. Those closest to the problems 
understood some of the sources of weak performance and had ideas for changing 
procedures and organizational structures. These professionals knew that they had a stake 
in turning around performance and were able to suggest strategies for improving KPIs. 
When their strategies were accepted and became company policy, they were willing to 
implement “their” suggestions—even when the changes required greater effort and 
changes in responsibilities. By including them in task forces, they became resources for 
managing change: they documented past performance and were in a position to establish 
targets for the future. 
 Select measurable goals: Resource limitations have a way of constraining organizations. 
Top managers have limited attention spans and information-processing capabilities. So it 
is important to decide early on what the targets will be and how success will be 
measured. To some extent, those closest to the problems may not be aware of possible 
solutions: they may be wearing blinders that limit their sense of what is possible. We 
know that people cannot manage what they cannot measure. However, everything is not 
of equal importance, and the costs of data collection become a drain on time that should 
be spent on analysis. NWSC leaders knew that when organizations attempt to measure 
everything, the managers end up understanding very little. Consequently, NWSC 
formulated only a few priority indicators relating to financial improvement, operational 
efficiency, and staff productivity. The selection of indices reflected the performance 
situation at that time. Of course, measuring what matters requires consensus on priorities. 
Furthermore, the focus should be on what is important, not just what is easily measured. 
 Design internal incentives: Designing incentives involves making employees 
responsible for outcomes, delegating authority, providing information and resources, and 
promoting accountability. Although the CEO had ultimate responsibility for improving 
performance, he could not do it alone. The challenge was to empower decision-makers 
throughout the organization: managers responsible for delivering high performance. 
Identifying an individual’s responsibilities and holding him or her accountable is the 
central problem facing top managers. Thus, NWSC focused on delegating authority to 
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those with information and designing incentives that induced managers to meet 
reasonable goals. However, caution was needed, since autonomy can also be used for 
personal gain. Without creating a climate of suspicion, managers shared information (in 
formal and informal settings) to determine whether managerial autonomy was being used 
appropriately. Historically, abuse of office was accepted since salaries in SOEs were low 
relative to corresponding responsibilities. NWSC adopted the following: “strategic 
oversight means keeping your eyes on but your hands off”. Clearly, a case by case 
approach to intervention was necessary. The incentives affected all stages of production: 
(1) input acquisition (equipment selection and transparent bidding); (2) production 
processes; (3) system maintenance; (4) service delivery; and (5) service quality. 
 Establish lines of communication: Internally, NWSC developed a program design 
outlining clear roles and responsibilities, including bottom-up approaches to strengthen 
program ownership and support. These specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and 
timely (SMART) targets were later strengthened through the use of “stretched” (tougher) 
targets (reflecting the “stretch out program”). NWSC then introduced competition for 
managerial responsibility through business plan preparation and expressions of interest. 
Although incumbent managers had information advantages, the process forced 
incumbents to review their current processes and personnel. Their “competitors” gained 
experience in preparing plans and budgets. Furthermore, some switches alerted all 
managers that NWSC expected its professionals to deliver innovative programs. In 
addition, NWSC instituted strong incentive systems and equitable gain-sharing plans to 
minimize employee shirking tendencies. As the organization’s leaders gained a handle on 
past trends and baselines across the eight to ten local water distribution companies, they 
were able to develop tailor-made monitoring and evaluation arrangements and 
benchmarking activities. The performance contract with several ministries served as the 
ultimate guide for decision-makers. 
 Develop and implement strategies: Developing strategies involved borrowing ideas 
from many organizations and people. NWSC wanted to avoid the “not invented here” 
syndrome where ideas from outside the organization would face particularly steep 
hurdles. The staff brought numerous excellent ideas to the table—many based on their 
graduate training, suggestions from customers, or contacts within other organizations. 
NWSC evaluated every idea that came in terms of its impact on short-term objectives and 
long-term goals. Giving attention to all ideas gave confidence to those who generated 
them. It gave a sense of ownership to strategies that were eventually considered, adopted, 
and implemented. This participatory approach had reinforced the new corporate culture 
that was emerging from the organizational reforms. The new governance system was 
making a difference. 
 Ensure accountability: Accountability requires that tasks be well-defined and 
appropriately assigned. The outcomes are anticipated, reviewed, and evaluated. Just as in 
privately-owned companies, NWSC managers are rewarded for taking risks and creating 
efficient ways to deliver quality service. Executives attempt to practice active-listening so 
that circumstances behind failure are heard and evaluated in a meaningful manner. If this 
is not done, managers of the local water distribution divisions may not take risks for fear 
of reprimands. Such an outcome would be counterproductive to performance 
improvement initiatives. 
 Review results: A continuing theme of the turnaround initiative has been that reform is a 
process, not an end in itself. The objective was to improve sector performance. As the 
data indicate, the transformation has been successful, but every manager knows that 
much more needs to be done. Satisfaction with accomplishments does not imply that new 
goals are unnecessary. In fact, past achievements signal that the organization has great 
potential for expanding the efficiency frontier. For example, NWSC has created an 
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external services group that serves as a consulting arm of the utility—teaching best 
practice to managers of water utilities in other nations (Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, 
and India). However, a good teacher is also a good student, learning from well-
performing elements in other operations. Furthermore, creative solutions to problems in 
other countries lead to better decisions in the home organization: win-win. The results for 
NWSC’s reform that began in 1998 are impressive (see table 1). 
TABLE 1 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NWSC, 1998-2010 
 1998 2010 
Water supply coverage (%) 48 74 
Non-revenue water (%) 60 33 
Collection efficiency (%) 65 98 
Metered accounts (%) 65 100 
New connections per year (thousands of connections) 3 25 
Total connections (thousands of connections) 51 261 
Turnover (revenue) (millions of dollars) 11 65 
Source: NWSC. 
ECLAC – Project Documents Collection Best practices in regulating State-owned and municipal water utilities 
61 
Annex 2 
The Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, Cambodia, 
case study 
The case of the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) documents the dramatic performance 
improvements that can be achieved by SOE (see table 2) (Das and others, 2010). 
TABLE 2 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PPWSA, 1993-2010 
 1993 2010 
Staff per 1,000 connections (employees) 20 3 
Production capacity (thousand cubic meters per day) 65 330 
Service coverage (%) 20 90 
Supply duration (hours per day) 10 24 
Supply pressure (meters) 2 25 
Number of connections (thousands of connections) 27 203 
Non-revenue water (%) 72 6 
Collection ratio (%) 48 99 
Operation ratio (operating expense/revenue) (%) 150 39 
Source: PPWSA. 
The KPIs speak for themselves. For example, the ability to control non-revenue water (related 
to leaks and to illegal connections) has improved the utility’s cash flow. A collection ratio of 99% 
reflects citizen confidence in (and appreciation for) service quality. 
 Improved finances: The installation of meters and a computerized billing system (with 
penalties for non-payment) increased the collection efficiency. Tariff were readjusted. 
 Illegal connections: Engagement with the local community generated support for other 
changes. Incentives were provided for citizens who reported illegal connections. In 
addition, a complaint resolution system was established. 
 Staffing: Recruitment and retention is not a matter of political connections, but is 
determined by performance. Merit-based hiring and promotion resulted in an 
organizational culture that promoted efficiency. Salaries are better than before the reform. 
 Targeted subsidies: To reach the poorest citizens, PPWSA created a revolving fund to 
finance connections, with poor households receiving subsidies of 30%, 50%, 70% or 
100% of connection fees. The extent of the subsidy depends on family incomes—thus 
recognizing the importance of targeting subsidies rather than just “keeping prices low”. 
 Private funds: In 2012, the company sold 15% of its shares to the public—indicating 
that sources of external capital will enable it to expand into neighbouring communities. 
As General Director Ek Sonn Chan has said, “it doesn’t matter whether water distribution 
is done by the private sector or a public agency, as long as these institutions are 
transparent, independent from political pressures, and accountable” (ADB, 2007). 
The story is similar to NWSC in Uganda: instead of being a department of the municipality, 
the utility became an autonomous public utility, with separate finances and operating rules. The case 
demonstrates that a public sector utility is capable of achieving high performance through business 
practices that emphasize results (meeting targets) and incentives. Of course, additional challenges 
remain: expanding sewerage service and extending coverage to peri-urban areas. However, the 
evidence to date suggests that management is fully capable of meeting these challenges. 
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Annex 3 
Water Industry Commission for Scotland: 
regulatory accounting15 
Scottish Water is a publicly-owned business, which provides water and sewerage services to 
households and also acts as the wholesaler in the market for business customers and public bodies. It 
is subject to regulation by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS). 
Regulatory accounts were introduced into the Scottish water industry in 2005. They are one of 
the key sources of information that WICS needs to regulate the industry effectively. 
What are regulatory accounts? 
Regulatory accounts are a series of financial reports that are designed to provide regulators with 
information about the performance and financial health of the companies they regulate. They are 
compiled according to accounting conventions stipulated by the regulator. 
In contrast to the statutory financial accounts that are consistent with international accounting 
standards, regulatory accounts are tailored to take account of the economics of the particular regulated 
industry. These accounts tend to require more detailed information about costs and revenues than 
statutory accounts, and are completed using different accounting conventions. 
Statutory accounts are subject to changes in accounting practices and standards. Such changes 
had an impact on year-on-year monitoring of Scottish Water’s performance. In order to align reported 
performance with regulatory targets WICS had to make significant and complex adjustments. This 
reduced the transparency, and made it more difficult for stakeholders to form a reliable view of 
Scottish Water’s performance. Regulatory accounts make it possible to collect information from 
Scottish Water consistently over time. 
Whereas statutory accounts are generally completed using historic cost accounting, regulatory 
accounts also use current cost accounting. Current cost accounting is a more useful measure for 
regulators as it allows them to take a view of the current value of the regulated company’s assets and 
the likely cost of replacing them. 
Purposes of regulatory accounts 
Regulatory accounts are designed to take into account the specific circumstances of the water industry. 
They serve the following main purposes: 
 Monitoring progress. Regulatory accounts make it possible to monitor annual progress 
against the assumptions underlying price controls and other regulatory decisions. These 
cover areas such as the amount of revenue received from customers, the level of 
borrowing, interest payments, taxation, financial ratios, operating expenditure, 
depreciation, spending on capital maintenance and other capital investment. 
 Informing future regulatory decisions about price controls. The ability of the 
regulator to promote cost containment at a quality that is valued by consumers depends 
largely on setting prices that are consistent with challenging but achievable expectations 
on financial performance. In setting prices, it is very useful to compare the performance 
achieved by regulated utilities, but robust comparisons demand consistent information, 
which is only possible with regulatory accounts. 
                                                        
15 On the basis of WICS (2011a) and (2011b). 
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 Revealing potential anti-competitive behaviour. Water utilities perform both core (the 
provision of water services) and non-core activities (such as specialized wastewater 
treatment for industrial customers). It is in the interests of “core” customers that revenue 
collected from them is not used to subsidise non-core activities. In order to help guard 
against any cross-subsidisation, regulatory accounts clearly separate the costs and 
revenues associated with each element of the business. Where any transactions take place 
between the two, they must be completed according to a transfer pricing framework that 
is set out in regulatory accounting rules. 
 Facilitating competition. Scottish Water sells wholesale services to licensed suppliers 
who “retail” them on to non-household customers. WICS regulates wholesale charges. It 
uses regulatory accounts to define retail and wholesale activities in detail and to capture 
the costs associated with wholesale activities. This helps give players in the market 
confidence that wholesale charges are soundly based and cost reflective. 
Regulatory accounts are not only useful for the regulator. By completing regulatory accounts, 
the regulated company also generates information in a format that can be used to inform its own 
management decisions. The transparency generated by regulatory accounts may also be useful to 
customers, policy makers and other stakeholders. 
Regulatory accounting formats 
Each year Scottish Water provides WICS with an Annual Return submission, which includes 
regulatory accounting tables that collect the following information: 
 Historical cost income and expenditure accounts and balance sheets. 
 Current cost income and expenditure accounts, balance sheets and cash flow. 
 Reconciliation of historical cost balance sheet to the statutory accounts. 
 Five-year rolling summaries on current cost income and expenditure accounts. 
 Regulatory capital value. 
 Current cost analysis of fixed assets by asset type. 
 Activity based costing of the water and wastewater service. 
 Analysis of revenue, interest, net debt and taxation. 
 Transfer pricing—both capital expenditure and profit and loss. 
Regulatory accounting rules 
WICS uses the following regulatory accounting rules: 
 Introduction: Provides a brief overview of each rule and a glossary of terms. 
 Accounting for current costs and regulatory capital values: Sets out the requirements 
for current cost accounts, limitations on uses and various simplifications adopted for 
application in the Scottish water industry. 
 Classification of expenditure: Classifies expenditure by purpose category. 
 The contents of regulatory accounts: Covers the requirements for accounting 
information, and the rules by which regulatory accounts should be completed each 
financial year. 
 Analysis of operating costs and assets: Covers the form, content and principles of the 
analysis of operating costs, revenues and tangible fixed assets. 
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 Transfer pricing: Provides guidance on the procedures and methodologies to be 
followed when completing transactions between the core and non-core activities and 
associate entities. 
Audit of regulatory accounts 
Regulatory accounts are audited externally. The auditors form an opinion based on whether Scottish 
Water has complied with the regulatory accounting rules. Only where these rules are silent on an 
accounting issue would generally accepted accounting principles apply. 
The auditor considers all of the information that he or she deems necessary in order to 
determine that the regulatory accounts are free from material misstatement. However, they do not 
assess the overall adequacy of the presentation of the information in the accounts. This is because the 
form and content of the accounts are determined by the regulator. 
Scottish Water also provides a signed declaration alongside its regulatory accounts. This 
declaration states whether Scottish Water has sufficient financial resources for the next 12 months. It 
also declares whether or not transactions and activities with associated companies were completed on 
an “arm’s length” basis. 
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Annex 4 
Citizen engagement, accountability, 
and utility performance 
The focus of WSP (2007) is on how institutionalized citizen engagement promotes better 
accountability, improved utility performance, and customer responsiveness/awareness of the issues in 
the service delivery chain. The report alludes to the five elements that characterize successful public 
service provision, as identified in World Bank (2003): 
 Delegation (setting of performance standards): the customer asks for a service and 
defines the terms on which it should be delivered. 
 Performance: service delivery measured against these performance standards. 
 Finance: the customer pays for the service. 
 Information on performance: the customer (and public policy maker) assess service 
quality, efficiency and coverage. 
 Enforcement: dissatisfied customers and public policy makers penalize poorly-
performing providers. 
World Bank (2003) also distinguished between the “long route” to accountability and the 
“short route”. In the former, elected officials represent the public (voters) in holding utilities 
accountable. However, as we have seen, politics can introduce a number of factors that do not enhance 
utility performance. The “short route” is possible when citizens (current customers and those without 
service) have mechanisms for engaging directly with service providers. These mechanisms include 
procedures for formal complaints, participation in regulatory hearings, or involvement in utility 
advisory committees. WSP (2007) concludes that “End users are key in determining which services 
they find relevant, convenient, and affordable”. It should come as no surprise that institutional 
frameworks for governance and citizen input, programs for enhancing staff capabilities, and 
benchmarking are three elements that tend to appear in the various case studies. 
